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The author surveys and discusses recent case law and legisla-
tion dealing with the manifold aspects of commercial law. Pri-
mary among the topics examined are decisions concerning sales
of goods, products liability, warehousing and shipping, negotiable
instruments, sureties and guarantors, mortgages, banking, and
secured transactions, as well as legislation on both state and fed-
eral levels affecting these fields. Particular attention is given to
the impact of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 on secured
transactions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
t
This article' attempts to survey all cases and legislation arising
under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and in areas outside
of the UCC but within commercial law practice.
II. SALE OF GOODS
A. Venue
In actions against domestic corporations, three venue alterna-
tives are possible: (1) the place of business of the corporation; (2)
the place where the cause of action accrued; or (3) the place where
the property involved in the litigation is located. Thus, under sec-
tion 47.051 of the Florida Statutes, when a seller of mobile homes
in Palm Beach County mailed a letter to a buyer of mobile homes
in Putnam County telling the buyer that their continuing contract
was being cancelled, the breach of contract occurred in Palm Beach
County and proper venue was in Palm Beach County where the
cause of action accrued, and not in Putnam County.'
B. Goods and the Statute of Frauds
A contract between a university publisher and an author
whereby the publisher agreed to print books for sale to the public
was held not to be a contract for the sale of goods, but rather a
contract for services. Even though the contract did not specify the
1. This article surveys the cases reported in volumes 350 through 362 So. 2d and Florida
legislation enacted in 1978.
2. Perry Bldg. Sys., Inc. v. Hayes & Bates, Inc., 361 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)
(construing FLA. STAT. § 47.051 (1977)).
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number of books to be printed, the Statute of Frauds provision of
the UCC (section 2-201(1)), establishing that a written contract is
not enforceable "beyond the quantity of goods shown in such writ-
ing," was held inapplicable to the contract because it was not a sale
of goods.
3
Similarly, if a developer makes a direct and original promise
with a subcontractor to pay him for goods and services, this promise
is not covered by the Statute of Frauds, but if the developer prom-
ises to pay the subcontractor in the event that the general contractor
does not, this promise would be within the Statute of Frauds as a
promise to pay the debt of another.'
A dishonored check which stated that it was for a specified
invoice and which was deposited by the payee seller of goods was,
for at least that part of the contract, held to be within the Statute
of Frauds language of the UCC, "[w]ith respect to goods for which
payment has been made and accepted or which have been received
and accepted." 5 As a result, the check removed the case from the
confines of the Statute of Frauds and the buyer was deemed liable.,
Moreover, written acknowledgments sent by the merchant seller as
to which the merchant buyer failed to offer evidence of objection
also operated to remove the case from the statute.7
C. Remedies
In a suit by a seller against the buyer for breach of a sale of
goods contract, it is reversible error for the trial court to fail to
charge the jury that the seller is entitled to loss of profits under
section 2-708(2) of the UCC.8
In an action for goods sold and delivered, it is incumbent upon
the plaintiff seller to prove that the goods have, in fact, been sold
and delivered for an agreed price. In order to prove delivery, the
ledger sheets and delivery tickets of the plaintiff seller should be
admitted into evidence under section 90.803(6)(a) of the Florida
Statutes (Supp. 1976), even though there might be a question as to
the validity of the delivery tickets because the seller may be unable
to prove that the signers of the delivery tickets were persons autho-
rized to receive the goods.'
3. Mallin v. University of Miami, 354 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (per curiam).
4. Clover Interior Sys., Inc. v. General Dev. Corp., 357 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)
(interpreting FLA. STAT. § 725.01 (1977)).
5. FLA. STAT. § 672.201(3)(c) (1977).
6. Lea Indus., Inc. v. Raelyn Int'l, Inc., 363 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (per curiam).
7. Id. at 52 (applying FLA. STAT. § 672.201(2) (1977)).
8. Vagabond Container, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 356 So. 2d 1266 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
(per curiam) (construing FLA. STAT. § 672.208(2) (1975)).
9. Bosem v. A.R.A. Corp., 350 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (per curiam).
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Rule 43 of the Grain and Feed Dealers' National Association
provides that a seller's failure to ship grain in conformity with the
contract terms "shall be grounds for the refusal only of such ship-
ment or shipments, and not for the rescission of the entire contract."
A Florida district court of appeal has held that this exclusive rem-
edy under a contract for the sale of corn to a chicken farmer might
fail of its essential purpose under the UCC,10 with the result that
other UCC remedies would come into play. The case was therefore
remanded for a factual determination of the issue.
D. Products Liability
1. JURISDICTION
According to section 48.193(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes (1975),
any person who "commits a tortious act within this state" is subject
to personal jurisdiction. A Florida district court of appeal, however,
refused to subject to long-arm jurisdiction an out-of-state automo-
bile dealership which had, in North Carolina, serviced a car. The
automobile had first been owned by a rental company; subsequently
it was sold at auction in Florida and ultimately to Florida buyers
by a Florida car dealer. The court reasoned that exercising personal
jurisdiction under those circumstances would be too broad an inter-
pretation of the statute and would not satisfy the minimum contacts
requisites of due process." Moreover, section 48.193(1)(f)(2), which
subjects to personal jurisdiction nonresidents who cause injury to
persons or property in this state by the use of products serviced or
manufactured by the nonresident which are used or consumed in
Florida, could not be constitutionally applied to the foreign car
dealer because, under prior decisions, it would violate traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice."
On the other hand, a complaint which alleged that the plaintiff
had purchased a paint spray gun as a result of an advertising cam-
paign conducted by the foreign manufacturer in this state and that
the spray gun was distributed by the company for use by citizens
of this state is sufficient to give a Florida court jurisdiction under
section 48.193(1)(f) and (2) of the Florida Statutes (1975) and to
satisfy the minimum contacts required by the due process clause.
10. Tampa Farm Serv., Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 356 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978) (constru-
ing FLA. STAT. §§ 672.719(1)(a), (2) (1975)).
11. Jack -Pickard Dodge, Inc. v. Yarbrough, 352 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
12. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); Dunn v. Upjohn Co., 350 So. 2d 127
(Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
13. Electro Eng'r Prods. Co. v. Lewis, 352 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 1977). In Chinetti Garthwaite
Imports, Inc. v. Sadkin, 358 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), the court upheld jurisdiction,
under § § 48.193 and 48.194, over a Delaware corporation, a franchisor of automobile dealers,
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A foreign manufacturer which did not have any offices in Flor-
ida and which sold baseball helmets to retailers and baseball teams
in this state in accordance with telephone orders and purchase or-
ders was not subject to process under section 48.181 of the Florida
Statutes (1975) because it did not retain any control over its cus-
tomers in this state; its Florida customers were not brokers, jobbers,
wholesalers or distributors. Also, the manufacturer had no control
over the helmets in this state." It should be noted, however, that
section 48.182 was not enacted until after the occurrence of the
injury in this case and was therefore not applicable. 5
The mere fact that a foreign manufacturer's products are com-
ponent parts of forklift vehicles used throughout Florida was not
sufficient to subject the manufacturer to the jurisdiction of the Flor-
ida courts under section 48.193(1)(f)(2) of the Florida Statutes
(1977) when the manufacturer had no other contacts with Florida.
Although the statute does attempt to confer jurisdiction, it would
have been unconstitutional to do so here because there were insuffi-
cient contacts with Florida and maintenance of the suit would have
offended traditional notions of fair play." Inasmuch as the case
involved a suit by an individual Florida plaintiff against a corpora-
tion in Florida which filed a third party claim against the foreign
manufacturer, one must wonder why the corporation in Florida did
not use the vouching-in process permitted by section 672.607 of the




In a products liability case, when the product, a tire, which had
been sold and mounted on a police car in Sebring, Florida and had
subsequently exploded near that city, killing a police officer, and
in a breach of warranty suit brought by a retail customer. The decision was based on a review
of the franchise agreement and the deposition of the franchisee auto dealer, setting forth the
actions of the franchisor and franchisee before and after the execution of the agreement. In
contrast, the same court in HYCO Mfg. Co. v. Rotex Int'l Corp., 355 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 3d DCA
1978), held that a complaint did not sufficiently show the basis for long-arm jurisdiction over
the nonresident defendants. The plaintiff buyer of a truck in Florida was damaged as the
result of an accident in Ecuador and sued, in a Florida court, the Florida seller and various
out-of-state component parts manufacturers. See also World Business Consultants, Ltd. v.
Automotive Finishes, Inc. 352 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (upholding long-arm jurisdiction
under FLA. STAT. §§ 48.181, .193(1)(a) (1975)).
14. American Baseball Cap, Inc. v. Duzinski, 359 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
15. FLA. STAT. § 48.182 (1970) (repealed 1973). Long-arm jurisdiction over foreign manu-
facturers of products used and causing injury in Florida is presently provided for in FLA. STAT.
§ 48.193 (1977).
16. Harlo Prods. Corp. v. J.I. Case Co., 360 So. 2d 1328 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
17. See W. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 261
(1964).
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the plaintiffs and all material witnesses were residents of Sebring,
it was held to be an abuse of discretion for the trial court judge in
Miami to refuse to transfer venue to Sebring. Under section 47.122
of the Florida Statutes (1975), such a transfer should have been
allowed in the interest of justice and for the convenience of the
parties.8
3. WARRANTY AND TORT LIABILITY
According to one district court of appeal, in order properly to
allege a cause of action for breach of warranties under the UCC, the
complaint must include: (1) the facts of the sale of goods; (2) the
kind of warranty, whether an express warranty under section 2-313
of the UCC, an implied warranty of merchantability under section
2-314, or an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose
under section 2-315; (3) the facts which created the particular war-
ranty or warranties; (4) the facts showing a breach of warranty; (5)
notice to the seller under section 2-607(3)(a); and (6) the damages
incurred by the buyer as a result of the breach of warranty or war-
ranties. 9
In a products liability suit, it is not sufficient in the complaint
to allege that the goods are defective without alleging facts showing
in what manner they are defective or how they could have been
made safe; detailed facts must be alleged, not just conclusions. 0 In
addition, a suit brought against an importer and distributor of for-
eign cars for its alleged failure to warn of a design defect is fatally
defective unless it is alleged and proven that the importer had
knowledge of this defect.2 '
When a long period elapses between the manufacture of a pro-
duct and a subsequent injury caused by that product, it is necessary
to prove that the product was defective when it left the manufac-
turer. Proffered evidence that the manufacturer has made. design
improvements to a product as a result of new materials and im-
proved technology does not, by itself, show negligence in the manu-
18. Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. v. Moore, 355 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
19. Dunham-Bush, Inc. v. Thermo-Air Serv., Inc., 351 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
20. Rice v. Walker, 359 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
21. Skinner v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 350 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
In Ford Motor Co. v. Havlick, 351 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), the court upheld a
charge to the jury dealing with the duty of Ford to warn of the danger from the defective
design in the placement of the gas tanks of Pintos. The court affirmed a $1.74 million verdict
resulting from a rear end collision with a Pinto which had caused severe burns to the driver
as the alleged result of the improper placement of the gas tank.
In another case concerning the duty to warn, the court held that there were material
questions of fact as to whether there was a proper warning label on a container of detergent
regarding the dangerous propensities of the product and regarding the proper dilution of the
contents before use. Mathis v. National Lab., 355 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
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facture of the original product. As a result, this evidence is not
relevant to prove the fact that the original product was defective."2
In a products liability case where the plaintiff sued the manu-
facturer of a child's swing set, as well as the seller of the set and the
nursery which had purchased the set, and the plaintiff settled with
the nursery and the retail seller of the swing set, the amount of this
settlement must be deducted from a jury award against the ultimate
manufacturer.
2 3
In a case of apparent first impression in Florida,2" it has been
held that when a seller of a used aircraft showed the buyer the
engine and propeller logbook, which stated that the engine had been
completely overhauled and that new parts had been installed, and
the buyer testified that he had relied-upon the logbook and would
not have bought the aircraft except for the statements contained
therein, that the seller expressly warranted the accuracy of the
statements contained in the logbook under section 2-313 of the
UCC. Furthermore, it was no defense that the seller was not aware
that the statements in the logbook were false. Also, when the engine
failed and the buyer had to pay for the ground transportation of the
aircraft to overhaul facilities and for the overhaul, he was entitled
to recover these sums, under sections 2-714(3) and 2-715(2) of the
UCC, from the seller, the mechanic who did the initial overhaul,
and the defendant FAA inspector who certified the repairs as having
been done. The latter two parties did not appeal the question of
liability, only the amount of damages, and this case cannot be con-
strued as precedent for holding individuals in these categories liable
to a purchaser. The dissenting judge pointed out that, inasmuch as
a seller of an aircraft must transfer the logbook to the purchaser, the
effect of this case is to make every seller an express warrantor of the
contents of the logbook, and, accordingly, a warrantor that overhaul
and maintenance work was done in a workmanlike manner. He
considered this an unreasonable result.
In an overly succinct opinion, it was held that brochures issued
by a manufacturer of fiberglass and asbestos material used on house
exteriors, which were distributed by a distributor and installer of
the materials and which had been relied upon by an ultimate con-
sumer, could be sufficient to substantiate a case involving breach
of warranties, fraud and negligence charges against these parties. 5
22. Ellis v. Golconda Corp., 352 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). Similarly, another court
affirmed the dismissal of a complaint based upon the negligent design of a 20-year-old tractor,
which required the removal of its gas tank when certain repairs were being done. Hunt v.
Nowicki, 351 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976).
23. Leisure Group, Inc. v. Williams, 351 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
24. Miles v. Kavanaugh, 350 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
25. Garesche v. Textured Coatings of America, Inc., 352 So. 2d 1207 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
19791
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A district court of appeal has held that in the sale of a used
homemade "Custom Trike Honda Three Wheeler" motorcycle by a
dealer, there may be implied warranties of merchantability and
fitness under sections 2-314 and 2-315 of the UCC and express war-
ranties of dependability and safety under section 2-313, in spite of
the fact that the sales contract, signed by the purchaser, provided
for an "as is" sale. The court was of the view that the phrase "unless
the circumstances indicate otherwise," as found in section 2-316 of
the UCC, indicates that these "magic words" do not of themselves
rule out these warranties. The test is what was the understanding
of the parties, which test can be developed only through a full trial
and not upon summary judgment. The court also noted that even
if the "as is" disclaimer were effective as to warranties, it would not
necessarily preclude liability for negligence of the seller.2" The hold-
ing of this case that there can be implied warranties in the sale of a
used, homemade product seems to be extreme, and the view that
the "as is" sale is dependent upon the parties' understanding of the
terms appears, in a practical sense, to deprive the phrase of any real
meaning.
The Supreme Court of Florida, reversing two district courts of
appeal,2 held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur cannot be ap-
plied in tire blowout cases because it cannot be conclusively shown
on the basis of human experience that tire blowouts do not ordinar-
ily occur in the absence of negligence by the manufacturer, and that
this is particularly true when the tire has burst after it has been in
the possession of a party who has subjected it to significant use.21
Furthermore, it would not be appropriate to use this doctrine when
the facts of the accident were discoverable and provable and when
26. Knipp v. Weinbaum, 351 So. 2d 1081, 1083 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
27. Dayton Tire & Rubber Co. v. Davis, 348 So 2d 575 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hughes Supply, Inc., 336 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976).
28. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hughes Supply, Inc., 358 So. 2d 1339 (Fla. 1978).
Although the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur would be appropriate in some situations, unless
the injured plaintiff can establish that the instrumentality causing the injury was under the
exclusive control of the defendant, and that the accident would not have occurred in the
ordinary course of events without negligence on the part of one in control, an inference of
negligence should not be made. See W. PROSSE, THE LAW OF TORTS 214 (1971). See also Jones
v. Auburn Mach. Works Co., 353 So. 2d 917 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978), aff'd, 366 So. 2d 1167 (Fla.
1979). In Jones, the court reversed a summary judgment because there were material ques-
tions of fact as to whether a ditch digger was a source of latent or patent danger to a 16-year-
old boy who was employed to lay cable behind the machine. The plaintiffs sued the manufac-
turer for breach of warranty and under the theory of strict liability. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF ToRT § 402A (1965); see notes 30-31 and accompanying text infra. See also Schurr v. Royal
Globe Ins. Co., 353 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), dealing with the impropriety of directing
a verdict for the defendant before the plaintiff had completed his case in a products liability
action dealing with an allegedly defective riding lawn mower.
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the tires were not in the exclusive control of the manufacturer. 9
The doctrines of breach of implied warranty and strict liability
in tort "have become so intertwined"" that a district court of appeal
has held that a charge to the jury on implied warranty substantially
instructed the jury as to strict liability, and thus the refusal of the
trial court to charge the jury as to strict liability in tort had no
practical significance."'
The Supreme Court of Florida upheld the consitutionality, of
sections 95.11(3)(c) and 95.022 of the Florida Statutes (1975),32
which resulted in a products liability claimant having seven months
less time to sue than under the former statutes in effect at the time
of his injury. The court noted that a claimant does not have a vested
interest in a limitations statute, and if the amended statute has a
savings clause which permits suit within a set time, the statute is
constitutional."
4. LEASES OF GOODS
Although a lease of well pumps contained a disclaimer of im-
plied warranties of fitness for a particular purpose which- would
negate any implied warranty created under case law, it was possible
to show that oral statements made by the lessor during the opera-
tion of the pumps constituted oral express warranties which resulted
in a valid oral modification of the written contract.
34
5. INDEMNIFICATION
In a case of first impression in Florida, the District Court of
Appeal, Fourth District, decided that a retailer, who had had no
29. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hughes Supply, Inc., 358 So. 2d 1339, 1342 (Fla.
1978).
30. Sansing v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 354 So. 2d 895, 897 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976).
The Supreme Court of Florida adopted strict liability in tort in 1976. West v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976); see Murray, Commercial Law, 1976 Developments in
Florida Law, 31 U. MMmi L. REv. 895, 898-99 (1976). In a procedurally interesting case, the
supreme court decided that where a trial court dismissed, as a matter of law, a count in strict
liability prior to West, the issue should be considered on remand because it had been properly
brought. West was determined during the course of the appeal to the district court.
31. Sansing v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 354 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
32. In 1974, chapter 95 of the Florida Statutes was substantially revised and the changes
became effective January 1, 1975. Under the former statute, there was a four-year statute of
limitations for negligence/products liability cases. Under the revised statute, 95.10(3)(c), a
right of action based on the design, planning or construction of an improvement to real
property is cut off 12 years from the date of possession by the owner or from the date of
termination or completion of the contract. Under § 95.022, the saving clause, any action
which would be barred by the revision, but would not have been barred under prior law, could
be commenced before January 1, 1976, a one-year savings period.
33. Bauld v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 357 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 1978).
34. Barile Excavating & Pipeline Co. v. Vacuum Under-Drain, Inc., 362 So. 2d 117 (Fla.
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knowledge of the defective nature of a product and who was there-
fore exonerated in a suit by the injured consumer, was entitled to
indemnification for attorney's fees and the costs of the defense from
the manufacturer of the product. The manufacturer may be held
liable for the defective manufacture under either a negligence,
breach of implied warranty or strict liability theory. 5
If a manufacturer-lessor is negligent in manufacture of scaffold-
ing, then it is not entitled to common law indemnity from its lessee
for harm caused to third parties. If, however, the harm to third
parties was caused by the negligence of both the manufacturer-
lessor and its lessee, then the lessee may be liable for indemnifica-
tion to the lessor under a lease provision stating that the lessee
assumed all responsibility for claims arising out of the erection,
maintenance, use or possession of the equipment and that it agreed
to hold the lessor harmless from all such claims. This indemnifica-
tion agreement cannot be construed to bind the lessee to indemnify
the lessor against claims caused solely by the lessor's negligence,
unless there is a specific proyision containing such language.'
Even in the absence of an indemnification agreement, a manu-
facturer who is sued for an alleged breach of an implied warranty
and who may be passively negligent may bring a third party com-
plaint for indemnification against the employer of the plaintiff em-
ployee when it is alleged that the employer was actively negligent
in the use of the product."
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that an
active tortfeasor who negligently caused injury to the plaintiff may
not bring a third party complaint against the manufacturer of a
1st DCA 1978); see W.E. Johnson Equip. Co. v. United Airlines, Inc., 238 So. 2d 98 (Fla.
1970).
35. Pender v. Skillcraft Indus., Inc., 358 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). See also Montgo-
mery Indus. Int'l, Inc. v. Southern Baptist Hosp., Inc., 362 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978),
which held that when a subcontractor who is supplying a waste disposal system advises the
architect that his plans for the system are defective and then the subcontractor unilaterally
changes the component parts when the architect does not change the plans, the subcontractor
does not have a cause of action against the architect when the waste system catches fire and
causes damage. If the subcontractor had simply followed the architect's alledgedly defective
plans, it would have had a cause of action against the architect for negligence and could have
recovered in its third party complaint.
In another indemnification case, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, held that
a hotel was entitled to indemnification by an elevator servicing contractor for injuries suffered
by a hotel guest who was trapped in an elevator. In the absence of any clear provision in the
servicing agreement exonerating itself, the maintenance company was not shielded from
common law liability for indemnification. Hart Prop., Inc. v. Eastern Elevator Serv. Corp.,
357 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
36. Spring Lock Scaffolding Rental Equip., Co. v. Charles Poe Masonry, Inc., 358 So.
2d 84 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
37. Home Indem. Co. v. Edwards, 360 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
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drug used in the treatment of that injury. The drug allegedly aggra-
vated the injury to the victim of the tortfeasor bebause of negligent
manufacture. 8 The Fourth District followed the view established by
the Supreme Court of Florida that allowing indemnification of an
active tortfeasor for aggravation of injuries through negligent medi-
cal treatment would improperly expand traditional concepts of in-
demnity."
6. DAMAGES
In a suit between a homeowner and a manufacturer of roof tile
which was installed by a subcontractor, a court may award damages
for defective tile measured by the replacement costs rather than the
diminution of the value of the house because of the defective roof
when the cost of replacement is not grossly disproportionate to the
value of the entire house. 4
A jury award of $3,500 for breach of an implied warranty result-
ing from the consumption of maggot-infested saltine crackers was
not so excessive that the trial court should have ordered it reduced.'
Unless the damages awarded by the jury are "so excessive as to
shock the judicial conscience or to lead to the conclusion the jury
predicated its verdict on passion or prejudice," a trial court may not
order a remittitur.4
2
In a suit by condominium purchasers for damages for breach of
warranties of fitness and merchantability on the ground that a noisy
air conditioner rendered their unit uninhabitable, the test of the
breach is to be objective rather than subjective. Thus, the proper
question is "whether the premises met ordinary, normal standards
reasonably to be expected of living quarters of comparable kind and
quality."' 3 That these owners personally viewed the unit as uninha-
bitable was not sufficient. In addition, when the defect complained
of would be a continuing one and the facts showed that the value of
their unit had increased after their purchase, they could not recover
any damages, because the appropriate standard was the diminution
in value caused by the defect.
In another case concerning breach by a condominium develop-
ment corporation of an implied warranty of fitness, the court found
the measure of damages to be the cost of correcting the defects. The
alleged deficiencies were, inter alia, failure to provide soundboard,
38. Ewell Eng'r & Contracting Co. v. Cato, 361 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
39. Stuart v. Hertz Corp., 351 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1977).
40. Gory Associated Indus., Inc. v. Jupiter Roofing & Sheet Metal, Inc., 358 So. 2d 93
(Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
41. Sanders v. Nabisco, Inc., 359 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
42. Id. at 48.
43. Putnam v. Roudebush, 352 So. 908, 910 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (footnote omitted).
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moisture proofing and housing for hot water heaters and the instal-
lation of an incorrect voltage system. These inferior features did not
comply with the specifications incorporated into the purchase con-
tract and, as a result, changed the building plans filed with the local
government."
E. Legislation
Retail establishments which have a "no refund" policy must,
since October 1, 1978, post a sign at the point of sale stating this
fact. If the establishment fails to do so, it must grant a refund to a
customer who tenders the goods within seven days of the sale in an
unused condition and in the original carton, if one was furnished by
the seller. This law does not apply to food, to custom-made or
custom-altered goods, or to perishable goods."s
Every products liability insurance carrier in Florida must now
submit annual reports to the Department of Insurance giving de-
tailed information regarding products liability premiums written,
premiums earned, claims filed, claims paid, and on other relevant
matters. The Department of Insurance is required to provide a sum-
mary of the furnished information in its annual report."
Another legislative change relating to products liability con-
cerns the joinder of insurers as parties defendant and the statute of
limitations applicable to actions for products liability and fraud.,7
The amendment provides that products liability insurers may no
longer be joined as parties defendant with the insured; however, the
insurers must file with the court information as to the name of the
insurer, the name of each insured, the limits of coverage, and a
statement of any policy or coverage defense.' If the insurer indicates
in this statement that any coverage defense has been or will be
asserted, then the plaintiff may join the insurer as a party defen-
dant. In any event, after the rendition of either a verdict or a final
judgment in a nonjury trial, the insurer may be joined as a defen-
dant.'8 The amendment also makes clear that actions for products
44. B & J Holding Corp. v. Weiss, 353 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). The court upheld
the jury verdict against the builder under common law breach of warranty. The action was
not barred by the one-year statute of limitation under FLA. STAT. § 711.24(1)(g)(3) (1977),
since it was not bought under chapter 711.
45. FLA. STAT. § 501.142 (Supp. 1978).
46. Id. § 624.433.
47. 1978 Fla. Laws ch. 78-418, §§ 1, 2 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 46.051, 95.031(2)
(Supp. 1978)). Unfortunately, the official heading of the amendment is seriously misleading
because it refers to areas not dealt with by the act. For instance, while the heading provides
that the liability of manufacturers and sellers shall be based on the knowledge and technology
in existence when the product was originally sold, the amendment does not include such a
provision.
48. Id. § 2 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 46.051 (Supp. 1978)).
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liability and fraud must be brought within twelve years after the
initial delivery of the product or the commission of the alleged




The District Court of Appeal, Second District, held that a
shareholder of a corporation does not have standing to assert abulk
sales violation in the sale of the assets of a corporation. The share-
holder had objected to the proposed sale, and, as a dissenting stock-
holder, he had the right to be paid the fair market value of his stock.
The shareholder claimed status as a bulk transfer creditor, demand-
ing payment directly out of the purchase price of the assets. The
Second District held that the stockholder was not a creditor within
the meaning of section 1-201(12) of the UCC. In addition, he could
not qualify as a creditor under section 6-109, because that provision
protects only creditors having claims arising out of events occurring
before the sale, and the shareholder's right of redemption is not
effective until the consummation of the sale.50
III. WAREHOUSING AND SHIPPING PROBLEMS
The Supreme Court of the United States has upheld the consti-
tutionality of section -.2,19of the UCC, which allows a warehouse-
man to sell bailed goods to cover unpaid storage charges." The
Court held that the authorization of the statute to the warehouse-
man of the right to sell was not state action and, therefore, that the
bailee was not bound by the due process and equal protection re-
quirements of the fourteenth amendment. The Court declined to
find state action despite the bailor's argument that the statute au-
thorized private individuals to perform a function-the power to
execute a lien-traditionally exercised by a sheriff and that this
delegation to the warehouseman constituted state action. Since the.
enforcement of a lien is not a function which is "'traditionally ex-
clusively reserved to the State,' "52 the Court found this delegation
argument unpersuasive. The self-help allowed by section 7-210 to
warehousemen was, as a result, not subject to constitutional safe-
guards because it lacked state action, absent an allegation of partic-
ipation by public officials.
49. Id. § 1 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 95.031(2) (Supp. 1978)).
50. Brown v. Superior Pontialc. GMC, Inc., 352 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
51. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
52. Id. at 157 (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974)).
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If a stevedore no longer has custody of ashipper's goods which
have been placed in a bonded warehouse awaiting further shipment
to a buyer, and the facts show that the outgoing carrier has responsi-
bility to collect demurrage after the free time period53 has expired,
then this outgoing carrier is deemed to be the bailee and solely
responsible for any damage to the goods.5"
When a Florida company shipped cloth to a Mexican firm
which manufactured garments in accordance with the specifications
provided by the Florida company and some of the garments were
destroyed by fire while in the possession of the Mexican garment
manufacturer, then the latter would be deemed to be a bailee and
the loss would fall on the Florida bailor when the bailee showed that
it had exercised ordinary care in its custody of the garments. In
applying this common law rule, the court rejected the assertion that
the Mexican garment manufacturer was either a warehouseman
under section 7-204 or a merchant seller under section 2-509 of the
UCC.55
In Antillean Marine Shipping Corp. v. La Universal De Segu-
ros, C. Por A., 56 goods were delivered to a sea carrier, loaded on
board, then returned to Miami, the port of origin, and unloaded into
the carrier's warehouse because the ship had run aground. The
goods disappeared from the carrier's warehouse, and the shipper's
subrogating insurance company sued the carrier, claiming that the
carrier was liable for the full loss as a warehouseman. The carrier
asserted the $500 per package or customary freight unit defense
under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA),57 which was
referred to on the back of the bill of lading, and stated that "[t]he
provisions stated in said Act (except as may be otherwise specifi-
cally provided for herein) shall govern after they are discharged
from the ship and throughout the entire time the goods are in the
custody of the carrier. '58 Typed on the front side was a. boldface
legend providing that the "[c]arrier's and/or vessel's responsibility
and/or liability ceases at end of ship's tackle at port of discharge.""8
The court held that the typewritten wording, which conflicted with
the printed legend on the back of the bill of lading, was controlling.
53. The free time period is that during which a vessel may remain unloaded or goods
may remain at the pier before demurrage charges begin to accrue. See generally American
President Lines, Ltd. v. Federal Maritime Bd., 317 F.2d 887, 888-89 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
54. Sentinel Enterprises v. Harrington & Co., 353 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert.
denied, 359 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. 1978).
55. Breezy Bay, Inc. v. Industria Maquiladora Mexicana, S.A., 361 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1978) (per curiam).
56, 359 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
57, 46 U.S.C. § 1304 (5) (1970).




As a result, the effectiveness of the bill of lading terminated upon
return of the goods to the carrier's warehouse in Miami. Thus, the
court found that the protective provisions of COGSA were inapplic-
able, and it deemed the carrier a warehouseman and fully liable as
a bailee. Because the ship never reached the destination, the port
of discharge, however, the more logical conclusion would have been
to find that the second typewritten legend was irrelevant and that
COGSA limitations were governing.
In Allied Van Lines v. Bratton,5 the Supreme Court of Florida
reconciled a split among the district courts of appeal concerning the
effectiveness of a limitation of liability clause in a bill of lading
issued by a common carrier in accordance with ICC tariff regula-
tions. The court held that the shipper of goods is bound by the
limitation stated in the bill of lading, on the amount of recovery in
the event of loss even though the shipper had not read the limitation
clause and did-not know of its existence. If the carrier, however, had
induced the shipper not to read the contract or had misrepresented
to the shipper that additional coverage could not be obtained for
any potential loss, then the carrier would not have been allowed to
plead the limitation clause.
IV. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
A. Agency
The agency signing provision in section 3-403 of the UCC has
reared its ungainly head in an unusual way. The District Court of
Appeal, Second District, decided in Havatampa Corp. v. Walton
Drug Co. 61 that a complaint states a cause of action against an agent
as an individual, and that parol evidence could be introduced to
show the capacity in which the agent signed a promissory note,
where the principal's name appeared on the face of the instrument
and the agent signed his name and office but the note did not clearly
indicate an understanding by the parties that the agent would not
be individually liable.2 The promissory note stated that "we prom-
60. 351 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 1977). The district court of appeal decision, which required
knowledge of the clause by the shipper in order for the limitation of liability to be enforceable,
was criticized by the author in a prior article. Murray, supra note 30, at 910.
61. 354 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
62, See also Schwab v. Quitoni, 362 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (per curiam). A
secretary of a corporation had signed a promissory note without indicating his secretarial
status after his name. The court allowed parol testimony between the parties to show that
the secretary had signed not merely as a corporate officer but as a personal guarantor.
In Vacation, Inc. v. Southeast First Leasing, Inc., however, the appellate court affirmed
the holding of the trial court that the mere fact that the guarantor adds the word "Pres."
after his signature on a written guaranty separate from that of the corporation of which he'
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ise to pay," 3 with the word "we" typewritten into the printed sen-
tence. The printed signature lines, including the word "seal," were
typed into the note as follows:
Walton Drug Co., Inc. d/b/a Touchton Drugs
and/or - (Seal) X
Bob Edrington, Owner
- (Seal) X11
The "X" marks were handwritten, and the agent signed the note as
"Bob Edrington, President" on the second line above. The payee
asserted that Edrington had been informed at the time he signed the
note that he was to be personally liable on it. The Second District
stressed the importance of definiteness and certainty in commercial
papeP transactions; by allowing an agent to be personally bound
when he does not clearly indicate by the method of his signing his
representative capacity, the court attempted to eliminate
"technical objections by prospective takers of the paper, thereby
enhancing negotiability."6 5 Since ambiguity existed on the face of
the note as to the capacity in which Edrington signed, the court
allowed parol testimony under section 3-403 of the UCC to establish
the understanding of the parties at the time the note was executed.
B. Accord and Satisfaction
In a case of first impression in Florida, the District Court of
Appeal, Second District, held that (1) when a drawer issued his
check with the legend, "'LANDSCAPING PAID IN FULL' ",8 on
the bottom left corner of the face of a check and the legend
"'cashing of this check constitutes release andwaiver of any lien' ,
on the back of the check, and (2) the payees then typed under the
latter statement the following legend, "'negotiated by named pay-
ees under protest and with reservation of all their rights,' ""5 then
the payees could cash the check without previously communicating
was an officer does not affect his individual liability as a guarantor. 358 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 3d
DCA) (per curiam), dismissed, 360 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 1978).
63. 354 So. 2d at 1235.
64. Id. at 1236.
65. Id. at 1237 (footnote omitted).
66. Miller v. Jung, 361 So. 2d 788, 789 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). See also Pino v. Lopez, 361
So. 2d 192 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), (per curiam). There, a creditor cashed a check on which the
drawer had placed the legend, "[flull and final payment for all goods, services and claims
to date." In a subsequent suit by the creditor, summary judgment was properly entered
against him because his affidavit in opposition to the motion merely alleged conclusions of
law without facts supporting his contention that an accord and satisfaction had not been
entered into.




this language to the drawer and would not be barred from suing the
drawer for the unpaid balance of the account between the parties.
The "reservation of all their rights" language was in accordance
with section 1-207 of the UCC, which does not expressly require the
communication of an acceptance under protest to the drawer prior
to the cashing of the check. The court reasoned that to require
actual notification of the reservation of rights prior to negotiation
of the instrument would obviate the purpose of section 1-207, which
is to minimize "impediments to the flow of commercial paper while
reserving the rights of the immediate parties."'" The court was care-
ful to note that this decision would not bar proof on remand as to
whether there had, in fact, been an accord and satisfaction.
C. Defenses
One of the few defenses that a maker of a negotiable instrument
can assert against a holder in due course under the UCC is that,
under state law, the illegaility of the transaction was such as to
render the obligation of the party a nullity. 0 This defense was suc-
cessfully established in Paris v. Hilton," where the payee was a real
estate broker licensed in Georgia but not in Florida. Section 475.01
of the Florida Statutes (1975) required registration of parties per-
forming the duties of real estate agents or brokers in Florida; con-
tracts to pay the commissions of unregistered brokers are void as
part of the policy to protect the public from untrained or unsuper-
vised real estate dealers." Thus, the payee, who negotiated a real
property sale in Florida and received promissory notes for his com-
mission, could not recover on the notes because the obligation of the
maker was voided as a result of the statute. The theory underlying
the result also precluded any quantum meruit recovery.
In Jacobs v. Becks, 3 the issue of the proof of nonpayment neces-
sary to establish a prima facie case for recovery on the promissory
notes was resolved in favor of the payee. The payee's introduction
of the notes into evidence in a suit against the estate of the deceased
maker, the payee's mother, raised a presumption that the notes had
not been paid. The payee needed to provide no additional evidence
69. Id.
70. U.C.C. § 3-305(2)(b).
71. 352 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). The party's commission, for which the note was
made in payment, amounted to $315,070.
72. Id. at 635.
73. 355 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 362 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 1978).
74. Apparently, both parties agreed that any testimony by the payee as to nonpayment
would be barred by the dead man's statute. Id. at 1242 (citing FLA. STAT. § 90.05 (1975)).
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of nonpayment because the notes themselves were evidence of the
existence of the debt. Payment of the notes, an affirmative defense,
would have to be proved by the defendant. The dissenting judge,
however, pointed out that the payee did not testify that the note was
in the payee's possession at the time of her mother's death. Thus,
since the payee as personal representative of the deceased could
have obtained the notes from her nrother's effects after her death,
no presumption of nonpayment should arise.75
D. Usury"8
In Ellis National Bank v. Davis," a case of first impression in
Florida, the District Court of Appeal, First District, held that an
intentional computation of interest by a bank at a rate of ten per-
cent per annum, prorated on a 360-day, rather than 365-day basis,
constitutes the exaction of usurious interest. Moreover, under the
Uniform Banking Act,7" if the lender is a national bank, it forfeits
any interest not yet received and is required to pay the borrower
twice the amount of any interest already received. When the parties
have not agreed on a rate of interest for the loan, then the rate must
be six percent per annum in accordance with a Florida statute."9
E. Bad Check Laws
The crime of obtaining property in return for a worthless check,
as described in section 832.05 of the Florida Statutes (1975), does
require proof that the accused knew that he had insufficient funds
in the account to cover the check, but it does not require proof that
he had an intent to defraud.'" As a result, the standard jury instruc-
tion" which omits any mention of the intent to defraud is proper.
F. Escalation Clauses
The validity under Florida law of escalation or "indexing"
clauses, which are based upon the devaluation of the dollar, is un-
clear. The "Gold Clause" Resolution, federal legislation prohibiting
75. Id. at 1243, 1244-45 (Smith, J., dissenting).
76. For a discussion of other usury cases, see notes 114-121 & 233 and accompanying text
infra.
77. 359 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
78. 12 U.S.C. § 86 (1976).
79. FLA. STAT § 687.01 (1977).
80. State v. Berry, 358 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 1978).
81. THE SUPREME COURT COMM. ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES,
FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES 203-04 (2d ed. 1975).
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any obligation requiring payment in gold, in a particular kind of
coin or currency, or in an amount measured thereby,"2 is inapplica-
ble to obligations issued on or after October 28, 1977.3 Thus, the
result in Shaughnessy v. REC Centers, Inc.,V which appeared to
cast some doubt on the viability of escalation clauses, will affect
only these existing obligations. Shaughnessy involved a condomi-
nium recreational lease which contained an escalation clause. 5 A
class action was brought to invalidate this provision under the Gold
Clause Resolution. The trial court dismissed the complaint as not
stating a cause of action, but the appellate court stated:
Whether that clause is one which, by definition and in the
contemplation of the parties, (1) requires a particular kind of coin
or currency, or (2) requires payment in money of the United
States measured by gold or by a particular kind of coin or cur-
rency can only be determined upon appropriate proof and appel-
lants should have the opportunity to present that proof. s6
82. 31 U.S.C. § 463 (1970). The statute provides:
(a) Every provision contained in or made with respect to any obligation
which purports to give the obligee a right to require payment in gold or a particu-
lar kind of coin or currency, or in an amount in money of the United States
measured thereby, is declared to be against public policy; and no such provision
shall be contained in or made with respect to any obligation hereafter incurred.
Every obligation, heretofore or hereafter incurred, whether or not any such provi-
sion is contained therein or made with respect thereto, shall be discharged upon
payment, dollar for dollar, in any coin or currency which at the time of payment
is legal tender for public and private debts. Any such provision contained in any
law authorizing obligations to be issued by or under authority of the United
States, is hereby repealed, but the repeal of any such provision shall not invali-
date any other provision or authority contained in such law.
(b) As used in this section, the term "obligation" means an obligation (in-
cluding every obligation of and to the United States, excepting currency) payable
in money of the United States; and the term "coin or currency" means coin or
currency of the United States, including Federal Reserve notes and circulating
notes of Federal Reserve banks and national banking associations.
83. Act of Oct. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-147, § 4(c), 91 Stat. 1229.
84. 361 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
85. The clause provided:
In the event that the United States dollar should ever be officially devalued by
the United States government or replaced by a regular species of a lesser value,
then and in that event the rental to be paid by the lessee to the lessor or any
purchase price to the lessor by the lessee shall be increased in proportion to said
devalution so that the rental to be paid to the lessor or the purchase price of the
property covered by this lease to be paid to the lessor shall be the same in terms
of actual value as the United States dollar was on January 1, 1967.
Id. at 808. The Florida Legislature has recently passed a statute prohibiting the use of index
clauses in condominium agreements. 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-222, § 1 (codified at FLA. STAT.
§§ 718.302(3), .401(8) (Supp. 1976)); see Schlytter v. Baker, 580 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1978)
(upholding prospective application of these statutes).
86. 361 So. 2d at 809.
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Although this case involved a lease rather than a negotiable
instrument, the doubt about the validity of escalation clauses would
also affect negotiable instruments bearing these clauses. 7 Foreign
money clauses in negotiable instruments, as permitted by section 3-
107 of the UCC, however, might be a way of avoiding this problem.8
G. Legislation
A new Computer Crimes Act" provides that anyone who com-
mits a computer-related act for the purpose of devising or executing
any scheme or artifice to defraud is guilty of a felony of the second
degree. The Act seems to be drafted in a strange manner. For exam-
ple, the phrase "financial instrument"" is defined in great detail as
constituting written checks, notes, and so on; however, it is not used
in the remainder of the Act. Moreover, the definition of "financial
instrument" makes no reference to current section 674.4-104(1)(g)
of the Florida Statutes (1977) which, with respect to bank deposits
and collections, defines the word "item" as including any
"electronically recorded, stored, or transmitted message for the pay-
ment of money."
Another new statute concerning negotiable instruments autho-
rizes the Department of Education to sell student loan notes to the
federal Student Loan Marketing Association and to enter into
agreements to repurchase these notes from the federal association.9
V. SURETIES AND GUARANTORS
Recent Florida case law concerning guarantors of construction
loans clarifies the defenses available in particular situations.
Schaeffer v. Gilmer'2 involved a written guaranty agreement which
referred to various conditions precedent to the disbursement of loan
proceeds as set out in the construction loan agreement. The court
held that the two instruments had to be construed together. Al-
though this did not alter the express terms of the guaranty, it per-
mitted the guarantors, under their guaranty agreement, to assert
87. Id. (discussing Aztec Prop., Inc. v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank, 530 S.W.2d 756
(Tenn. 1975) (invalidating indexing clause in promissory note).
88. For instance, one could require payment in United States dollars measured by Ger-
man marks as of the day payment is due.
89. FLA. STAT. § 815.01-.07 (Supp. 1978).
90. Id. § 815,03(9).
91. Id. § 239.72(3).
92. 353 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
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affirmative defenses growing out of the construction loan agree-
ment.9 3
Another affirmative defense was successfully asserted by the
guarantors of a construction loan in Warner v. Caldwell."4 Because
a construction lender impaired the security by reducing a construc-
tion bond and by changing a fixed price construction contract to a
"cost plus" contract without the consent of the guarantors, they
were released from their guaranty even though the original guaranty
agreement contained wide-ranging waiver clauses as to extensions
of time, modification of security, and other pertinent matters. Guar-
anties will lose most of their utility, however, if the courts persist
in ignoring the contractual and economic facts.
Similarly, the District Court of Appeal, First District, has indi-
cated that the negligence of a construction lender in the supervision
and management of a construction loan fund and of the work of the
contractor would release guarantors of the debtor-ownet of the pro-
ject, in spite of the fact that the guaranty agreement gave the bank
carte blanche to waive and release the security, to release or substi-
tute collateral, and so on. 5
It is a relatively common practice for lessors of personal prop-
erty to require that the lease be guaianteed by parties who are not
lessees. When the lease provides for a waiver of a jury trial by the
lessees, this waiver may be effective against them, but it will not
be effective against the guarantors. Upon the guarantors' assertion
that the lease was in substance a loan and that the installment
payments yielded a usurious rate of return in excess of thirty per-
cent per annum, the guarantors, who were not parties to the lease,
will be entitled to a jury trial."
In another case involving guaranteed rent payments, the
stockholders of a lessee corporation executed a continuing guaranty
of payment to the lessor, his heirs and assigns. The lessor sold the
property and assigned the lease, together with all. past and future
rents due under the lease, to the grantee. The District Court of
Appeal, Fourth District, held that the grantee could enforce the
guaranty against the guarantors because the transfer of the lease
operated also as an assignment of the guaranty. In addition, the
93. The court also made extensive rulings on the various affirmative defenses. Unfortun-
ately, the terse style of the opinion does not make clear the analysis behind the conclusions
the court makes.
94. 354 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), cert. denied, 361 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 1978).
95. Gartner v. Atlantic Nat'l Bank, 350 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (per curiam).
Judge Smith's strong dissent, however, would seem to be the correct view.
96. Central Inv. Assocs. v. Leasing Serv. Corp., 362 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
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court decided that although the lessor reduced the monthly rent in
order to rent the premises, which the lessee corporation had aban-
doned, the guarantors were not released from liability because the
rent reduction was not a material change operating to the guaran-
tors' detriment.!7 This holding as to the definition of a material
alteration is of dubious precedential value, however, since one of the
Florida authorities cited by the court is irrelevant 8 and the other is
a minority view"9 advanced by an anonymous encyclopedia au-
thor.' ®
A guarantor may be precluded from using an alteration as a
defense if he complies with the change without asserting his rights.
In Gulfstar, Inc. v. Borg- Warner Acceptance Corp., "0' the guarantor
of a loan made to a retailer knew that the lender had relaxed the
repayment provisions of the loan. Since the guarantor failed to ob-
ject and continued to perform, he was held to have waived his rights
to raise this modification as a defense when he was called upon to
pay due to the default of the principal debtor."s2
In Spurrier v. United Bank, 03 the guarantors of the loan obliga-
tion of the corporate debtor unsuccessfully asserted the defense of
unauthorized execution of the promissory notes by the agents of the
corporation. The corporation had earlier filed with the lender bank
a corporate resolution which provided that "'James R. Latham,
Pres., Lowell V. Summerhays, Sec., are hereby authorized to exe-
97. Rizzi v. Serv. Dev. Corp., 354 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
98. The court, in a footnote, referred to two Florida cases. Id. at 900 n.4. Neither at-
tempted to define the elements of a material change or to relate materiality to a detrimental
effect on the guarantor. The first, Anderson v. Trade Winds Enterprises, 241 So. 2d 174 (Fla.
4th DCA 1970), held that extensions of time for payment accorded to the maker by the holder
of a note in default did not discharge the liability of the guarantors because the extensions
did not affect the guarantors' rights against the maker. Id. at 178. The second Florida case
cited as authority, Hollywood Shopping Plaza, Inc. v. Schuyler, 179 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 2d DCA
1965), did concern materiality, but the court used the term only in a conclusory manner and
did not define it in any fashion. The court made no reference to the detriment of the guaran-
tors. Id. at 574.
99. Hollywood Shopping Plaza, Inc. v. Schuyler, 179 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965). For
a discussion of the majority view, see H. ARANT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP AND
GUARANTY 264-84 (1931); W. HAWKLAND, CASES AND MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL PAPER AND
BANK DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS. 135-36 (1967); L. SIMPSON, SURETYSHIP 339-47 (1950); A.
STEARS, LAW OF SURETYSHIP 97-130 (3d ed. 1922).
100. Rizzi v. Serv. Dev. Corp., 354 So. 2d 898, 900 n.4 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (citing 38
AM. Juf. Guaranty § 81 (1968)).
101. 360 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (per curiam).
102. See Regal Shoe Shops v. Kleinman, 361 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), wherein
the court applied the suretyship law of New York to a lease guaranty. Since the lease was
modified with the apparent consent of the guarantor, an officer of the lessee corporation, the
alteration could not operate as a defense for the guarantor.
103. 359 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
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cute and deliver the promissory note or notes of this corpora-
tion.' "104 The bank loaned money to the corporation on the basis of
notes correctly signed by Latham but not by Summerhays; another
man signed his name to the line labeled secretary. The court refused
to allow the guarantors' denial of liability, which was grounded on
the fact that the notes were not executed in accordance with the
corporate resolution filed with the bank. The court determined that
the resolution was ambiguous because it did not clearly state
whether the signatures of both or either of these persons would be
sufficient. Hence, a corporate note signed by James Latham above
the line labeled secretary might come within the terms of this corpo-
rate resolution. Furthermore, the court reasoned that even if there
had been unauthorized execution of the notes, the signatures could
have been ratified by the corporation or it could have been estopped
to deny their authority because the corporation had received and
retained the proceeds of the notes."°5
Another affirmative defense which was unsuccessfully asserted
by a guarantor is that of the statute of limitations as a bar to liabil-
ity. When a guarantor promises to be responsible for debts to be
incurred in the future by the principal debtor, the statute of limita-
tions on this guaranty promise starts to run not from the date of the
promise but from the date of default in payment by the principal
debtor. 0
Although a guaranty can, in appropriate circumstances, be re-
voked, the modification or revocation must be both timely and in
accordance with any requirements of the guaranty agreement in
order to be effective. Thus, in Lea Industries, Inc. v. Raelyn Interna-
tional, Inc.,' °7 the guarantors were not able to assert this defense
successfully because the revocation was inadequately made. An ab-
solute continuing guaranty provided that it would bind the guaran-
tors for future sales "'until the same is revoked by the undersigned
in writing and delivered. . . by registered or certified mail.' ,,0' The
court held that the agreement was not modified by letters sent by
one of the guarantors to the seller telling it not to ship goods covered
by all pending orders, because the letters did not conform to the
criteria for revocation specified in the guaranty agreement. The
buyer and its guarantors were, as a result, liable for goods that were
104. Id. at 909.
105. The corporation, as maker of the notes, was one of the defendants. The effect of the
ratification rationale on the liability of the guarantors was not made clear by the opinion.
See id. at 909.
106. Toms v. Sentinel Star Co., 360 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
107. 363 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
108. Id. at 51.
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subsequently shipped in accordance with pending orders for which
final payment was not made.
On the other hand, a guarantor of a promissory note who, prior
to the lender's acceptance of a renewal note from the primary obli-
gor, communicates to the lender that the guaranty is revoked will
not be liable as a guarantor of the renewal note.'
It is reversible error for a court to award one guarantor an award
of fifty percent against a co-guarantor on a contribution basis when
there was a third solvent co-guarantor because each guarantor
would normally be liable for only one-third of the amount remitted
to the payee of the promissory note. The District Court of Appeal,
Third District, noted that the two guarantors had not informed the
trial court that a third guarantor was obligated on the note;"" how-
ever, inasmuch as the notes did bear the signatures of three guaran-
tors, it seems strange that the trial court did not raise the issue
itself.
VI. MORTGAGES
A. Execution of Mortgages
The Supreme Court of Florida has held that there is no longer
any requirement that a mortgage of homestead realty be signed in
the presence of two attesting witnesses. The present constitution
eliminated the words "duly executed" which were found in the for-
mer constitution and under which the courts had held that the
attestation by two witnesses was required."'
The District Court of Appeal, First District, followed this rule
when it held that where a deed is invalid because it is not witnessed
by two people, it may, nevertheless, constitute a mortgage which
does not require two subscribing witnesses if proof is presented that
the agreement was intended by the parties to secure an indebted-
ness rather than to convey title."'
B. Prepayment Deadlines
In regard to prepayment deadlines, the District Court of Ap-
109. Miami Int'l Bank v. First Int'l Realty Inv. Corp., 364 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
(per curiam).
110. Hanrahan v. Barry, 363 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
111. Moxley v. Wickes Corp., 356 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 1978). The former constitutional
provision had required that mortgages of homestead property be "duly executed." The courts
had interpreted this phrase to mean that two witnesses were required. The court observed
that the phrase "duly executed" had been deleted from the new constitution and, as a result,
the presence of two attesting witnesses would no longer be required.
112. Walker v. City of Jacksonville, 360 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
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peal, First District, has adhered to the traditional rule that the
courts will not rewrite or interfere with a valid contract. Only where
the facts indicate that the prepayment penalty is exorbitant will the
court intervene in the enforcement of the penalty by upholding a
mortgagor's claim that the payment unjustly enriches the mortga-
gee.,, 3
C. Usury*
The amendment to section 687.'11.(4) of the Flbrida Statutes"4
was not intended by the legislature to remove the interest limitation
of fifteen percent per annum from loans in excess of $500,000 to
corporations, but rather it was intended to remove a former incon-
sistency between the interest rates payable by an individual as a
maker as contrasted with a person who becomes an accommodation
party on loans in excess of the $500,000 figure. Under this interpre-
tation, an individual who is a surety or guarantor of a promissory
note in excess of $500,000 can legally be charged fifteen percent
interest in the event that the corporate maker is unable to pay all
of the amount owing.1
If an alleged lender should purchase the debtor's property and
then give the debtor a binding option to repurchase the property,
this arrangement will be deemed a disguised mortgage transaction,
and if the difference between the purchase price and the repurchase
price is great enough, the transaction can be deemed usurious."'
This "sale-option" concept has been extended to a case wherein the
debtor-vendor, although not bound to repurchase the property ac-
cording to the terms of the transaction, was economically bound to
repurchase because there was a vast disparity between the sales
price and the true value of the debtor's equity in the property." 7
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, decided one of the
most comprehensive usury cases in recent years, Continental Mort-
gage Investors v. Sailboat Key, Inc."' One of the primary issues
involved in the case was a conflict of laws question-whether Mas-
sachusetts or Florida law would apply. The agreement had stated
that Massachusetts law would govern, and under Massachusetts
law the contract was legal. The court, nevertheless, found that Flor-
ida law would control the case because the contract was usurious
113. Century Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Madorsky, 353 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
114. 1974 Fla. Laws ch. 74-232, § 2.
115. Woodgate Dev. Corp. v. HamiltonInv. Trust, 351 So 2d 14 (Fla. 1977).
116. Mears v. Mayblum, 96 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1957).
117. Bermil Corp. v. Sawyer, 353 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
118. 354 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (per curiam).
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and there was strong public policy in Florida against usury. Further-
more, Massachusetts had no real connection with the agreement
because the loan papers had been prepared in Florida, the land was
located in Florida, the loan funds were disbursed in Florida and the
lender's advisor company was a Florida firm. The reference to Mas-
sachusetts law was a bad faith effort to evade the usury laws of
Florida.
A second key issue in the case was whether the debtor could
plead usury as a defense to a foreclosure suit even though the two-
year statute of limitations,"' which ran from the time that the con-
tract was first entered into, had expired. The court ruled that the
statute of limitations had not run because the parties had entered
into a subsequent mortgage agreement and the usury became a part
of this later transaction, which was not time barred. In addition,
even if the statute of limitations had expired, the defense of usury
is always available where the lender brings a suit to foreclose the
loan. On other issues, the court held that the value of the debtor's
corporate stock taken by the lender was correctly considered as
interest where the stock had a specific value at the time it was
issued to the lender and such value was not contingent upon the
success of the venture which was financed by the loan. Under the
penal statute for usury, section 687.11(4) of the Florida Statutes
(Supp. 1974), the penalty for charging a usurious interest rate to a
corporation is twice the amount of interest to be paid on the loan
when the amount of the loan exceeds $500,000. Finally, the court
held that since the penal statute for usury was not in effect when
the loan in question was entered into, the statute could not be
applied to the lender.
When a lender charges a "mortgage loan discount" which is
deducted from the loan proceeds, it is a question of fact whether this
amount is to pay the lender for out-of-pocket expenses in servicing
and making the loan or is interest which, provided that a corrupt
intent is shown, might render the loan usurious. This question of
fact cannot be decided in a summary judgment proceeding. 20  .
If a mortgage provides that the lenders are to participate in the
profits of a development venture in the event houses are built and
sold, but the venture failed with no houses ever being built and the
participation clause was not in the note, then the transaction will
not be deemed usurious. 121
119. FLA. STAT. §§ 687.071(2) & 775.15(2) (c) (1975).
120. Abromowitz v. Barnett Bank, 356 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).




The District Court of Appeal, First District, has held that when
a recorded minor amendment modestly increased the amount of the
original note and mortgage and provided for a few other modifica-
tions, it is not to be deemed a promissory note and, as a result,
documentary stamps are due only for the increased amount and not
for the original amount for which documentary stamp taxes were
already paid.' 2 The court based thi's ruling on the fact that there
had been no intention manifested to discharge the original loan or
to make a new promise to pay the original amount. Rather, the
amendment went solely to the additional sum loaned. This ap-
proach is one way of reducing the amount of documentary stamp
taxes which might otherwise be due on "wrap-around mortgages."
In a subsequent case, the First District resolved a similar issue
in a questionable decision. The court again held that additional
documentary stamps on the amount of the original promissory note
were not required. In this case, however, the amount of the loan was
increased after documentary stamps had been affixed; the debtor
signed a second promissory note for the original borrowed amount
and the advance. The First District decided that documentary
stamps were needed only for the advance in accordance with section
201.09(1) of the Florida Statutes (1975). The dissenting judge, in
contrast, pointed out that the statute only covers an extension of the
original note, not an enlargement thereof, and that the statute
would seem to impose documentary stamps on the full amount in-
cluding the original principal and the advance.
2 3
The First District has also held that the documentary stamp
tax on a deed given to a mortgagee in lieu of foreclosure should be
based upon the value of the property conveyed. There was a pur-
chase money mortgage of $665,000 on land and the purchaser then
gave a second mortgage to another for $200,000. The mortgagor
subsequently deeded the land back to the seller in satisfaction of the
$665,000 mortgage and the seller-grantee assumed the $200,000
mortgage on the basis that the mortgagor was insolvent and the
property was worth only $450,000. The court held that documentary
stamps based upon a consideration of $450,000, not $865,000, should
be placed on the deed. Normally, the stamps would be based upon
the assumption that the value of the mortgaged land was equal to
the amount of the debt, but here the facts shoWed that the land was
122. Rainey v. State Dep't of Revenue, 353 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
123. State Dep't of Revenue v. Miami Nat'l Bank, 354 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
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actually worth considerably less tian the total debt consisting of the
two mortgages.'
2'
When $11,700 was lent and a promissory note provided that the
borrower would repay $20,127.60 payable in 180 monthly install-
ments of $111.82 and.it further provided that the amount financed
was $11,700 with the difference of $8,427.60 as a finance charge over
the life of the loan, documentary stamps were due only on the prin-
cipal sum of $11;700 and not on the total sum of $20,127.60 under
section 201.08(1) of the Florida Statutes (1973). The court noted
that there is no legal difference between this form of a note and one
which states that the principal amount is $11,700 and which pro-
vides that the maker is bound to pay interest and principal until the
note is paid in equal periodic payments, such payments to be ap-
plied first to the payment of principal with the privilege of prepay-
ment. This latter note would be subject to stamp taxes for $11,700
and not for the added interest.' 5
Pursuant to sections 201.01 and 201.08 of the Florida Statutes
(1975), in a good faith transaction where the last essential signature
required on a promissory note and mortgage encumbering Florida
land was made in Georgia to a loan association located in Georgia,
there was no taxable situs in Florida. Thus, documentary stamp
taxes could not be assessed.'
In State Department of Revenue v. Zuckerman-Vernon
Corp., 2 the Supreme Court of Florida held that the good faith of
the taxpayer in affixing less than the required amount of documen-
tary stamps to a transaction is not enough to justify the lessening
of statutory penalties, the imposition of which was mandatory under
the former Florida statute governing penalties for failure to pay the
tax.*21 In addition, the court evidently accepted prior case law ex-
empting from the documentary stamp tax a conveyance of property
by a trustee not pursuant to a sale.' 2' The facts of this case, however,
124. Keebler v. Department of Revenue, 360 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
125. Department of Revenue v. North Port Bank, 354 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
126. Rainey v. Department of Revenue, 354 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
127. 354 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1977).
128. The court imposed the statutory penalty pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 201.17(2) (1975),
which required payment of the penalty. The taxpayer contended that this statute was inappl-
icable and that the amended version, which is the present statute, was controlling. FLA. STAT.
§ 201.17(2) (1977) does not make payment of a 100% penalty mandatory. Instead, the present
statute provides for a 100% penalty if fraud is. proven; otherwise, the penalty is equal to 25%
of the purchase price of the documentary stamps not affixed. The court was not persuaded
by this argument for retroactivity of the more liberal amended statute. It allowed only pro-
spective application.
129. 354 So. 2d at 354-55 (discussing River Park Joint Venture v. Dickinson, 303 So. 2d
654 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)).
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did not qualify for the exemption. Although there was a joint ven-
ture agreement naming the corporation as trustee of the land which
was sold, no express trust was created because the corporation used
its own funds to purchase the land and took title solely in its corpo-
rate name so that the corpus of the trust was never within the
dominion of the purported donor, the joint venturer.'30
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, held that a trans-
fer of mortgaged property by a subsidiary corporation to its parent
without the payment of any additional consideration is subject to
documentary stamp taxes computed upon the amount of the en-
cumbrance because it is a shifting of the economic burden of paying
the mortgage. The fact that the tax was not paid as a result of a good
faith belief that it was not due is not sufficient to prompt a reduc-
tion in the penalty assessed for nonpayment. 3 '
The District Court of Appeal, First District, held that because
the Florida Bar is an official arm of the Supreme Court of Florida,
when it executes a note and mortgage in order to borrow money, the
state documentary stamp taxes may not be levied upon the transac-
tion. Under article II, section three of the Constitution of the State
of Florida, which requires the separation of governmental power into
three branches, the legislature may not levy a tax upon the judiciary
because it is a separate branch of the government.'32
Sections 201.02 and 201.021 of the Florida Statutes (1975) pro-
vide that the amount of the documentary stamp tax levied on deeds
of conveyance of real property shall be determined by the considera-
tion paid in the transaction. The Department of Revenue sought,
through rule 12A-4.13(22) of the Florida Administrative Code, to
assess the tax on conveyances of land by development firms by
determining the value of the land plus the value of improvements
to be constructed thereon at a later time. The District Court of
Appeal, First District, invalidated the rule, finding that it was with-
out statutory basis because the rule would extend the tax beyond
the limits established by legislative authority in the relevant stat-
utes. The court held that only the value of the land could be subject
to the documentary stamp tax."'
The First District also determined the proper application of
130. The result might have been different if the corporation had been a party to the joint
venture agreement. The joint venture agreement was made by two parties, one of whom was
the sole owner of the corporation. This stockholder, however, executed the agreement solely
in an individual capacity. Id. at 356.
131. Win-San Bldg. Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 358 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
132. Florida Bar v. Lewis, 358 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
133. Department of Revenue v. Young Am. Builders, 358 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 1st DCA
1978).
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section 201.02(1) of the Florida Statutes to the assignment of a
leasehold subject to existing mortgages. The assignee did not as-
sume the mortgages but did make substantial mortgage payments
subequent to the assignment of the lease. The Department of Reve-
nue sought to assess the documentary stamp tax on the amounts of
the mortgages. The court determined that the consideration upon
which the tax is based must have a reasonably determinable pecuni-
ary value in order to support the tax. Where a mortgage is assumed,
or where there i' a conveyance in fee subject to a mortgage, the
consideration is sufficiently definite to satisfy the criterion. The
assignment of leasehold subject to a mortgage, however, does not
constitute reasonably determinable consideration unless the as-
signee assumes the obligation. The assignee "need pay the mortgage
to protect his interest only as long as his leasehold interest contin-
ues, and that interest may terminate in any of a multitude of ways.
The economic burden of paying the mortgage is contingent upon
continuation of the leasehold."'' 4 Thus, the tax cannot be imposed
op the basis of the unassumed mortgages because the situation is
akin to that of paying rent, and leases are ordinarily not stibject to
documentary stamp taxes because the consideration is executory
and, therefore, eludes definite valuation.
A Class C intangible tax is imposed on all promissory notes
secured by mortgages on real property.'3 5 The amount of the tax is
determined by the face amount of the obligation. The tax must be
paid prior to recording the mortgage; the only exception is for mort-
gages providing for future advances, in which case the tax is payable
when the advances are made. 3 ' When Class C intangible taxes are
paid on the full face amount of construction mortgages and the full
face amount is never disbursed, claims for refund must, under sec-
tion 215.26(2) of the Florida Statutes, be made within three years
of the payment of the tax.'37 Thus, if a mortgage is to secure further
advances, then the intangible tax is to be paid on the original ad-
vance and on all subsequent advances when they are actually made.
If construction loans can be fitted within the future advance provi-
sion and taxes are paid only when the advance is made, the problem
of a refund is obviated.
134. Department of Revenue v. Dix, 362 So. 2d 420, 422 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
135. FLA. STAT. § 199.032 (1977).
136. Stewart Arms Apts., Ltd. v. Department of Revenue, 362 So. 2d 1003, 1004 (Fla.
4th DCA 1978).




In a case of first impression in Florida, the District Court of
Appeal, First District, held that mere agreement, albeit written and
duly recorded, by the debtor not to sell or encumber real property
did not create an equitable lien or mortgage in favor of the creditor.
The court, however, implied that if the agreement evidenced the
parties' intent to make the property security for the debt, then an
equitable mortgage or lien may have been created.: In addition, the
court ruled that a written, recorded option to purchase property did
not constitute an equitable interest in the land, but such an option
did act as a valid encumbrance on the land, binding all successors
in interest who had real or constructive notice by the recording.,"8
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, refusing to fol-
low a decision of the Third District, 3 ' held that a letter sent by
clients to their attorneys stating that the clients were thereby giving
to the attorneys all of their right, title and interest in certain real
property and the proceeds from same as security for legal fees and
other debts was sufficient to create an equitable lien on the property
in favor of the attorneys. The Second District found that although
the assignment was not sufficient to create alien or mortgage, the
letter manifested an intent that the assigned property serve as secu-
rity. This intent was sufficient to create an equitable lien.',
F. Defenses
Generally, a mortgage is not binding and enforceable unless it
is supported by sufficient consideration. The District Court of Ap-
peal, Third District, held that where a mortgagor agreed to execute
a mortgage in favor of the mortgagee so that the mortgagee could
assign the mortgage and use it as a downpayment on a business, the
mortgage is not founded upon sufficient consideration. At no time
was there a debt existing between the mortgagor and the mortgagee.
Because the mortgagor had received no benefit and the mortgagee
had suffered no detriment, the court found that the mortgage was
unenforceable due to lack of consideration. The court implied that
if, instead of being assigned, the mortgage had been executed di-
rectly to the third party assignee of the mortgage, then sufficient
consideration probably would have been present.'
On the other hand, failure of consideration, rather than a total
138. Hansen v. Five Points Guar. Bank, 362 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
139. Mason v. Antonacci, 342 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
140. Amacher v. Keel, 358 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
141. Kremser v. Tonokaboni, 356 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
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absence thereof, will not render a mortgage subject to rescission
unless accompanied by some other ground. Thus, where a mortgagor
tried to rescind a mortgage because the mortgagee had failed to
release part of the encumbered land at the closing of the transaction
as earlier agreed, rescission was not justified because the failure of
consideration was not accompanied by fraud, misrepresentation,
overreaching or undue influence. The court reasoned that although
the failure to release the land amounted to breach of a dependent
covenant, which might warrant the remedy of rescission, the mort-
gagor had an adequate remedy at law for damages under the cir-
cumstances of the case and rescission should not be granted. Thus,
the court reinstated the mortgagee's foreclosure proceedings and
allowed the mortgagor to assert a counterclaim for damages. 4 '
In a case of first impression in Florida, the District Court of
Appeal, First District, held that a real property mortgage securing
a promissory note does not become a secured transaction under
section 9-104(10) of the UCC when the mortgage and note are as-
signed by the mortgagee as security for a bank loan.4 1 Instead, the
transaction is properly governed by the real property laws. The
assignee bank had recorded the assignment of the mortgage but did
not give notice to the mortgagor or perfect a security interest. After
the assignment was recorded, the mortgagor paid the entire sum due
to the mortgagee, for which the mortgagor obtained and recorded a
satisfaction. The mortgagor failed to investigate whether the mort-
gage had been assigned. Subsequently, the mortgagee defaulted in
the loan payments and the bank foreclosed the the mortgage. The
First District decided that the mortgagor could not defeat the fore-
closure by attempting to bring into play the provisions of article 9
of the UCC. The court also noted that the mortgagor failed to de-
mand that the mortgagee surrender the mortgage upon payment of
the debt. This observation is loosely worded, at best. The original
mortgage can be destroyed after recording and it has no effect; the
court must have had in mind the rule that the negotiation of the
promissory note is also a negotiation of the mortgage and the maker
of the note pays it at his peril without a surrender of it.
The defenses of estoppel or waiver may be available to a mort-
gagor if the mortgagee attempts to reform the mortgage. Thus, when
a mortgagee accepted mortgage payments in mistaken amounts for
seventeen months without protesting to the mortgagor and then
waited an additional ten months before filing suit to reform the
142. Duncan Properties, Inc. v. Key Largo Ocean View, Inc., 360 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 3d DCA
1978).
143. Rucker v. State Exch. Bank, 355 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
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mortgage to conform to a deposit receipt agreement, the suit should
be dismissed on the basis of either waiver or estoppel.'
Another defense available to a mortgagor in a foreclosure suit
is that the mortgagor lacked capacity to enter into the contract.
Under Florida law, a corporation may not purchase its own stock if
doing so would deplete the capital surplus of the firm.'45 Thus, a
mortgage given by a corporation to a stockholder as partial consider-
ation for the purchase of his stock is .void and unehforceable when
the purchase price exceeds the capital surplus of the corporation.'46
In a factually peculiar case, the District Court of Appeal, First
District, found a note and mortgage unenforceable. The builder who
held the mortgage had recklessly constructed the mortgagor's house
on the wrong property. The court also denied the builder's claims
for return of the house."1
7
G. Foreclosure
Although a mortgagee may foreclose a mortgage and take pos-
session of the mortgaged property, the mortgagee does not take
completely free and clear, but must assume the obligations that run
with the property. Thus, when a mortgagee forecloses on a condomi-
nium unit which was subject to a recreational lease, the mortgagee
remains liable to make payments under such lease."8
An agreement purporting to modify the terms of a note and
mortgage must be carefully drawn in order to achieve its intended
purpose. The District Court of Appeal, First District, found ineffec-
tive an agreement between the Small Business Administration
(SBA) and the mortgagees which provided that the mortgagees
would give thirty days notice to the SBA before instituting foreclo-
sure proceedings. The promise was made to induce the SBA to grant
a loan to the mortgagors to repair damage to the mortgaged prop-
erty. The court held that the agreement did not consitute a modifi-
cation of the mortgage so as to require the mortgagees to give thirty
days notice before accelerating the, entire debt upon default by the
mortgagors. The court declined to give the undertaking effect be-
yond its terms. The required notice was for foreclosure and not for
acceleration. "
144. Thompson v. Gross, 353 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
145. FLA. STAT. § 608.13(9)(b) (1977).
146. Naples Awning & Glass, Inc. v. Cirou, 358 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
147. Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Johns, 361 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
148. City Nat'l Bank v. Home Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 356 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 4th DCA
1978).
149. Boiling v. Lamberson, 352 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
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The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
has promulgated procedural guidelines for foreclosing federally-
insured mortgages in default. 150 Although these guidelines are not
mandatory, failure of the mortgagee to comply with the rules may
be raised by the mortgagor as an equitable defense to foreclosure
proceedings.''
Generally, a mortgagee is not justified in seeking a mortgage
foreclosure when the breach of the mortgage agreement is merely
technical. In Delgado v. Strong,5' however, the Supreme Court of
Florida established that even a technical default may, in certain
circumstances, warrant foreclosure. The mortgagors' failure to se-
cure insurance was not only a technical default in the terms of the
mortgage, but also sufficient ground for the mortgagees' belief that
the security of the mortgage was in jeopardy. As a result, the mort-
gagees were justified in accelerating the balance due on the mort-
gage.
When a foreclosure sale is made through the judicial sales pro-
cedures provided by section 45.031 of the Florida Statutes (Supp.
1978), a correct legal description of the property must be contained
in the notice of sale. If an error is made in the description, any sale
made under the incorrect description should be vacated and the
property resold.'53
A defendant in a mortgage foreclosure action brought by a bank
has the right to attempt discovery of Florida and federal inspection
reports obtained from the bank dealing with this loan, but, under
section 658.10(1) of the Florida Statutes (1975), the judge should
make an in camera inspection of the Florida records before turning
them over to the defendant. As to the federal report, Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation Regulation No. 309 provides that these
reports are the property of the F.D.I.C. and are not to be disclosed.
Therefore, the defendant must attempt to secure the reports from
the F.D.I.C., and a court should not compel the plaintiff bank to
produce copies of the reports.'54
150. Cross v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 359 So. 2d 464, 465 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
"Specifically, these guidelines direct that the agency contact a mortgagor in default and make
substantial efforts to try to rectify the default by assisting the mortgagor in various ways."
Id.
151. Id.
152. 360 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1978).
153. Hyte Dev. Corp. v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 356 So. 2d 1254 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).





In general, the power to grant deficiency decrees rests in the
sound discretion of the court. The decision to deny a deficiency
judgment in mortgage foreclosure actions must, however, be sup-
ported by sound and sufficient reasons. In Hamilton Investment
Trust v. Escam bia Developers, Inc.,'55 the District Court of Appeal,
First District, held that this standard is satisfied when the testi-
mony shows that the value of the foreclosed property exceeds the
amount owed under the mortgage.
In the event that a mortgage and promissory note provide that
the encumbered land is to stand as sole security for the debt and
that there is to be no recourse against the maker-mortgagor, then,
of course, the mortgagee is not entitled to a deficiency judgment
against the maker-mortgagor after foreclosure."' Such a promissory
note would not be negotiable because it would not be an uncondi-
tional promise to pay but, in fact, a promise to pay out of a particu-
lar fund.'57
Finally, a mortgagee who is the high bidder at a foreclosure sale
should not, in the absence of specific provisions to the contrary in
the final judgment of foreclosure, be treated differently from any
other bidder. Where the final judgment is silent as to who pays the
cost of documentary stamps when the mortgagee is the successful
bidder, the mortgagee would not be entitled to be reimbursed for
this tax because a purchaser normally would not be so reimbursed
unless the court explicitly directed the repayment."
I. Construction Loans and Mechanics' Liens
In order for a court to impose an equitable lien, factors such as
fraud, deception or material misrepresentation must be present.
Absent such a showing, the failure of a lending institution to ad-
vance remaining funds under a construction loan to the project
owner does not justify a court in creating an equitable lien in the
undisbursed funds for the benefit of the insolvent owner's credi-
tors.' On the other hand, a construction lender who has foreclosed
its mortgage and has acquired title to the improved property should
not be allowed to keep the property and, at the same time, refuse
155. 352 So..2d 883 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
156. Heim v. Kirkland, 356 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
157. U.C.C. § 3-104 (1)(b), -105(2)(b) (criteria for negotiability).
158. Tymber Skan Properties Ltd. v. Lutheran Mut. Life Ins. Co., 358 So. 2d 1370 (Fla.
2d DCA 1978).
159. Chase Manhattan Bank v. SiD Enterprises, Inc., 353 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)
(per curiam).
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to disburse construction funds to the contractor who had finished
construction. As a result, it is only fair to allow the contractor an
equitable lien against the foreclosing construction lender for the
balance of the undisbursed funds.' 0
A construction mortgage condominium lender whose mortgage
tracks section 711.25 of the Florida Statutes (1971), which restricts
the uses to which seller-developers can use a buyer's deposit monies,
does not create a fiduciary undertaking by the lender to collect and
manage these deposits for the benefit of the buyers. Moreover, even
though the lender has the right to inspect the quality of the con-
struction work, this does not render him liable to the buyers if the
work is defective.''1
In a case of apparent first impression in Florida, the District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that a mortgagee's lis
pendens filing in a foreclosure action and the subsequent judicial
sale of the property barred any claim by a mechanic's lien claimant,
who filed his lien after the lis pendens filing and who did not inter-
vene in the mortgage foreclosure action within twenty days as re-
quired by the lis pendens statute. The mechanics' lien statute pro-
vided that when a lien is filed, it relates back to the time of the filing
of the notice of commencement,"'2 which was filed before the lis
pendens. In this case, however, there was no lien to relate back to
since the lien was unenforceable under the lis pendens statute.' As
a result, the foreclosing mortgagee prevailed.'
In another recent case, the District Court of Appeal, First Dis-
trict, found circumstances in which a mechanic's lien holder may
impose an equitable lien on undisbursed loan funds in the event of
foreclosure by the mortgagee. The contractor holding the me-
chanic's lien was barred from foreclosure thereof because the mort-
gagee had earlier filed an action to foreclose the mortgage, accompa-
nied by a notice of lis pendens. Although the imposition of an equi-
table lien in such circumstances normally requires some fraud or
misrepresentation by the mortgagee, because the mortgagee had
continued to disburse funds pursuant to the construction loan after
the mortgagor defaulted and because the lienholder, as a result, did
additional work for which it had not been paid, the court did allow
160. Blosam Contractors, Inc. v. Republic Mortgage Invs., 353 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 2d DCA
1977).
161. Armetta v. Clevetrust Realty Inva., 359 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
162. FLk. STAT. § 713.07(2) (1975).
163. Id. § 48.23.
164. Cleveland Trust Co. v. Ousley Sod Co., 351 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); accord,
Giffin Indus., Inc. v. Southeastern Assocs., Inc., 357 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
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recovery by the lienholder from the undisbursed funds. This result
will not obtain except in situations where the construction is com-
pleted, because the mortgagee's unjust enrichment, which justifies
the equitable lien, would not be present if the mortgagee foreclosed
on an unfinished project. This unjust enrichment arises from the
mortgagee's ability to bid on the completed property in the foreclo-
sure sale even though it retained the undisbursed loan proceeds.'"
In a related case, the Supreme Court of Florida refused to find
the mortgagee estopped from asserting the priority of its mortgage
without proof by the subsequent lienholders of fraud or misrepresen-
tation by the mortgagee. The loan officer's assurances to subcon-
tractors that there seemed to be enough money left in undisbursed
loan funds to pay them and complete the project did not amount
to "affirmative deception" equivalent to fraud or misrepresentation
necessary to give the subcontractors' liens priority over the pre-
viously recorded mortgage.' Thus, it appears that an innocent mis-
representation will not be sufficient to support equitable estoppel of
the mortgagee. Proof of fraud is required.
After foreclosure proceedings through which a purchaser of con-
struction loans suffered a financial loss, the purchaser may recover
damages covering the loss from a third party whose negligence was
the cause of the faulty construction necessitating foreclosure. Thus,
a purchaser had a cause of action in tort against a professional
engineer who signed blank work completion certificates and deliv-
ered them to the contractor, which used them to induce the con-
struction lender to make payments for work allegedly performed.
The engineer admitted knowing that the payments would be made
upon the strength of his certificates. Hence, he was held liable de-
spite a lack of privity between him and the complaining purchaser
of the loans. 67
J. Attorney's Fees
The general rule is that in the absence of a statute or an express
or implied agreement, an attorney is not entitled to a charging lien
against his client's realty.' As a result, where a mortgagee's attor-
neys were entitled to fees for foreclosing on the mortgaged property,
which the mortgagee subsequently bought at public sale, the attor-
165. Giffin Indus., Inc. v. Southeastern Assocs., Inc., 357 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
166. Rinker Materials Corp. v. Palmer First Nat'l Bank, 361 So. 2d 156, 158 (Fla. 1978).
167. Barrett, Daffin & Figg, Inc. v. McCormick, 362 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (per
curiam).
168. E.g., Billingham v. Thiele, 109 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 1959).
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ney's fees may not constitute a charging lien on the real property.
Nevertheless, a court may properly order that the certificate of title
be issued to the mortgagee only after proof of payment to the attor-
neys of the amount due."'
VII. BANKS AND BANKING
A. Jurisdiction
When a Florida firm negotiates oral contracts with an out-of-
state bank and performance is to be made solely out of state, then
the Florida firm cannot secure long-arm jurisdiction over the bank
under section 48.193(1)(g) of the Florida Statutes (1975) because
there were no acts to be performed in this state. Jurisdiction would
be proper under section 48.193(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes, how-
ever, because the oral transaction caused the foreign bank to engage
in a business venture in this state.
70
B. Venue
The venue privilege of a national bank established in the Na-
tional Bank Act allows suits against such institutions only in the
federal district in which the bank "may be established" or in any
state court in the county or city in which the bank is "located."''
The Supreme Court of the United States has interpreted this stat-
ute to mean that venue is not confined to the county in which the
bank's charter was issued. Instead, venue can be laid in any county
in which the bank has an authorized branch. 
17
Although the venue provision is mandatory, a national bank
may, in appropriate circumstances, be found to have waived the
privilege. In Landmark Bank v. Giroux,17 1 the Supreme Court of
Florida found that a waiver of the federal venue privilege did not
occur when a bank repossessed the loan collateral, a car, in a county
other thanthe one in which the bank was located. A waiver may be
proved, however, by "conduct demonstrating voluntary and inten-
169. Overholser v. Walsh & Nottebaum, 362 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (per curiam).
170. Bank of Wessington v. Winters Gov't Sec. Corp., 361 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 4th DCA
1978); Citizens State Bank v. Winters Gov't Sec. Corp., 361 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
171. 12 U.S.C. § 94 (1976), which provides:
Actions and proceedings against any association under this chapter may be had
,in any district or Territorial court of the United States held within the district in
which such association may be established, or in any State, county, or muncipal
court in the county or city in which said association is located having jurisdiction
in similar cases.
172. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. Bougas, 434 U.S. 35 (1977).
173. 358 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1978).
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tional relinquishment or abandonment"' 7 ' of the privilege. The re-
covery of collateral from a jurisdiction chosen by the debtor is not
tantamount to entry for the purpose of doing business. The dissent-
ing justices, on the other hand, believed that a waiver had occurred
to the extent of the tortious act, wrongful repossession, which the
bank had committed in the foreign jurisdiction. The approach fol-
lowed by the majority is consistent with that elsewhere adhered to;
in the absence of an express waiver, a national bank may be sued
only in the district or county in which it is located. Thus, the com-
mission of a tort or the entering into of contracts in a foreign district
is not sufficient to support an inference of waiver of the venue privi-
lege. 75 Similarly, the mere fact that a national bank owns real prop-
erty in Florida does not constitute a waiver of the right to assert that
proper venue is in the federal court in the district where the bank
is established or in the state court in any county in which the bank
is located, in the sense of any county in which it conducts a branch
bank. "' Finally, the venue privilege is not waived when a bank
moves to dismiss a complaint on other grounds and subsequently
moves for a protective order. Instead, the bank may later file a
supplemental motion to dismiss for improper venue.'77
C. Credit Union Share Drafts
The District Court of Appeal, First District, has held that it is
permissible for credit unions to use "share drafts;" which are drafts
drawn on the credit union but payable through a commercial bank,
as a means of withdrawal, even though these share drafts resemble
checks drawn on commercial banks and perform most of the same
functions. In disagreeing with the Department of Banking and Fi-
nance, the court noted that chapter 657 of the Florida'Statutes and
the Department's rules are entirely silent as to the method to be
used by credit union members in withdrawing funds from their ac-
counts. The court also recognized that although the Department
had not done so, it could by general rule confine commercial banks
and credit unions to distinct financial roles and could articulate
appropriate practices for credit unions and prohibit others.'
174. Id. at 181.
175. Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Melru Int'l,'Ltd., 351 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
176. First Pa. Bank v. Oreck, 357 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
177. Beal v. Third Nat'l Bank, 350 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
178. Florida Bankers Ass'n v. Leon County Teachers' Credit Union, 359 So. 2d 886 (Fla.
1st DCA 1978).
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D. Bank Deposits
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, has held that a
depositor may not sue a bank for breach of contract for violating the
terms of a deposit agreement when the violation was made at the
depositor's request. The agreement provided that all withdrawals
would have to be made in the presence of the depositor's trial law-
yers because the depositor wanted to prevent her husband from
obtaining funds by forging her name. The withdrawals were made
at the request of, and were received by, the depositor, although not
all were made in the presence of counsel. The Third District allowed
the depositor no cause of action. The court distinguished between
general deposits, which create a debtor-creditor relationship and
may be drawn on in the usual course of the depositor's banking
business, and special deposits, which create an agency relationship
and do not contemplate a credit on a general account. The court
found that this deposit was a general one because the funds were
not to be segregated from the other assets of the bank and no specific
purpose other than a credit on a general account was contemplated.
The depositor had the right to terminate the arrangement at any
time and to withdraw from the account. Furthermore, even if the
deposit were to be labeled a special account, the depositor would
have no action against the bank because she received the funds.'
E. Set-off
A depository bank may exercise its rights of set-off against the
checking account of its customer, a building contractor, for debts
owed by the contractor to the bank, despite the protests of subcon-
tractors who presented checks drawn on this account which were
dishonored by the bank. The subcontractors could prevail, however,
if they could prove that the bank knew that this account was im-
pressed with a trust for their benefit. 180
F. Governmental Controls
When a hearing officer has found that applicants for a proposed
bank have proved five of the required six criteria for the granting of
a charter, 8' and has recommended that the applicants be given an
additional fifteen days to file an amended petition regarding the
179. Grillo v. City Nat'l Bank, 354 So. 2d 959 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (per curiam).
180. Northside Bank v. Electrical Enterprises, 353 So. 2d 927 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978) (per
curiam).
181. FLA. STAT. § 659.03(2) (1977).
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sixth criterion, it is an abuse of discretion for the comptroller to
deny the application without giving the applicants permission to file
the amended petition.'
In Carroliwood State Bank v. Lewis,' the District Court of
Appeal, First District, indicated that unless a bank can allege the
unconstitutionality of a statute, rule or regulation or can show that
there is an inadequacy of administrative remedies under the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act, 8' a Florida circuit court does not have juris-
diction to entertain an action between the bank and the Depart-
ment of Banking and Finance. The bank is relegated to administra-
tive hearings and appeals to the district court of appeals as provided
by the Act.
Section 626.988 of the Florida Statutes (1977), which forbids
any persons employed by a financial institution, including banks,
savings and loan associations or holding companies of these institu-
tions, from being insurance agents, applies to employees of produc-
tion credit associations and federal land bank -associations, as these
are deemed to be financial institutions.'"
The District Court of Appeal, First District, recently deter-
mined that an assistant vice president of a bank does not come
within the terms of section 692.01 of the Florida Statutes (1977),
which provides for the execution of instruments conveying, mort-
gaging or affecting any interest in a corporation's land by a corpora-
tion's "president or any vice-president or chief executive officer."
Thus, a lease signed by a bank's assistant vice president would be
invalid in the absence of proof that the bank had authorized him to
execute the lease. Under the statute, a vice president would have
presumed authority to execute the lease. 186
G. Legislation
Under an amendment to section 665.391 of the Florida Stat-
utes, savings associations may not charge homeowners a penalty
182. Public Bank v. Department of Banking & Fin., 351 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977);
accord, McDonald v. Department of Banking & Fin., 361 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978);
see Fraser v. Lewis, 360 So. 2d 1116 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (upholding denial of charter applica-
tion because order of denial sufficiently explicit about reasons for discretionary act of denial).
See also First Nat'l Bank v. Lewis, 355 So. 2d 869 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), which upheld the
authorization of the establishment of a branch bank, over the protests of a competitor, when
the Department of Banking and Finance followed the requirements of the Administrative
Procedure Act and advised the bank of the financial risks. The court gave great weight to
the Department's decision because of its expertise.
183. 362 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
184. FLA. STAT. §§ 120.500-.73 (1977).
185. Production Credit Ass'ns v. Department of Ins., 356 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
186. Florida First Nat'l Bank v. Dent, 350 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
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greater than two percent when they prepay home loans of less than
$100,000.18? In addition, any loans which can be made by a savings
association may now provide that the mortgage will cover future
advances pursuant to section 697.04 of the Florida Statutes
(1977).'" The same act"8' also changed, among other things, the
rules governing the publishing of financial statements'" and the
time and place for directors' meetings."'
Additional legislation regarding loan contracts has been en-
acted in two areas. Industrial savings banks that make loans which
exceed thirty-six months in duration may not charge a discount of
more than eighteen percent per annum simple interest calculated
on the assumption that the loan will be paid in accordance with its
agreed terms, regardless of whether the loan may be paid or col-
lected prior to the stated maturity." 2 Furthermore, section
687.03(2)(a) of the Florida Statutes, which deals with usurious
loans, has been amended to provide that it and section 687.02 shall
not apply to a loan or other advance of credit pursuant to a commit-
ment to guarantee a loan issued by the Veteran's Administration
nor a commitment to purchase a loan issued by the Federal Na-
tional Mortgage Association, Government National Mortgage Asso-
ciation, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation or any instru-
mentality of the Federal government.'
Section 659.061(6) of the Florida Statutes was changed to pro-
vide that if a trust company establishes a trust service office at the
location of a bank that has trust powers, the bank shall retain its
trust powers. In addition, a trust company which is establishing a
trust service office in a bank that has trust powers may elect in its
application with the consent of the bank to become a successor
fiduciary. Finally, a trust company which has established a trust
service office at a bank that has retained its trust powers may there-
after elect with the consent of the bank to become a successor fidu-
ciary.1
94
The Florida Legislature made changes in two statutes concern-
ing destruction of financial records. Banks and trust companies may
now destroy their records, files or copies thereof after ten years.
Ledger sheets, however, may not be destroyed unless copies are
187. FLA. STAT. § 665.391(2) (Supp. 1978).
188. Id. § 665.391(5).
189. 1978 Fla. Laws ch. 78-40.
190. FLA. STAT. § 665.121 (Supp. 1978).
191. Id. § 665.703(5).
192. Id. § 656.17(1).
193. Id. § 687.03(2)(a).
194. Id. § 659.061(6).
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retained. The legislation also defines the various copying processes
which may permissibly be used by banks and trust companies.'"
The Department of Banking and Finance may now destroy corre-
spondence files and other recbrd*s which the Department no longer
desires to preserve in accordance with retention schedules and de-
struction notices established by the Division of Archives, History,
and Records Management of the Department of State. These sched-
ules and notices relating to financial records, however, are subject
to the approval of the Auditor General."' This amendment seems
to be a delegation of authority by the legislature to a department of
the executive branch, subject to veto by yet another department of
the executive branch.
The Florida Legislature made other significant changes in the
area of banking. State funds may now be deposited in state savings
and loan associations and in federal savings and loan associations.'"
In addition, the Credit Union Guaranty Corporation Act has been
extensively amended."' Among other things, these changes provide
for the powers and duties of the corporation,"' the effect of payment
of claims, " and- the prevention.of insolvencies in credit unions."'
Furthermore, federal stock associations may now convert into state
chartered stock associations and vice versa upon a vote of fifty-one
percent or more of the members or stockholders eligible to vote."2
Finally, the Direct Deposit of Public Funds Act was adopted to
permit all public agencies to withdraw, pay or disburse all public
funds in their control by direct deposit to the account of the person
entitled to receive such funds.2"
VIII. CONSUMER PROTECTION
In an action under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade
Practices Act,"' a court may award a money judgment in the event
of a violation involving a consumer transaction. A "consumer trans-
action" is defined as including a sale, lease, or other disposition of
goods to an individual relating to a business opportunity which
requires the individual to expend money or property and his per-
195. Id. § 658.11(1), (5).
196. Id. § 17.27(1).
197. Id. § 18.10.
198. 1978 Fla. Laws ch. 78-123.
199. FLA. STAT. § 657.258 (Supp. 1978).
200. Id. § 657.261.
201. Id. § 657.262(1)-(2).
202. Id. § 665.061(1)-(2).
203. 1978 Fla. Laws ch. 78-406, § 2.
204. FLA. STAT. §§ 501.201-.213 (1977).
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sonal services in a business "in which he has not been previously
engaged."10 5 Therefore, an award of monetary damages to individu-
als who were victims of deceptive practices in the sale of franchises
cannot stand in the absence of proof that these victims have not
previously been engaged in franchise operations."'
The Florida Deceptive Practices and Unfair Trade Practices
Act provides for an award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party
in litigation involving an alleged violation of a regulation. 07 In
Johnny Crews Ford, Inc; v. Llewellyn,"8 the District Court of Ap-
peal, Second District, found that fees may be awarded for the suc-
cessful defense of a counterclaim. A car dealer had sued the buyer
for the unpaid portion of the purchase price; the buyer counter-
claimed, alleging unfair and deceptive trade practices by the car
dealer. The trial court granted a directed verdict against the buyer
on the counterclaim.
In Marshall v. W & L. Enterprises,"' the District Court of
Appeal, First District, found that the surety of a bonded mobile
home dealer was liable for payment to the consumer, who prevailed
against the dealer, of attorney's fees and costs'-under the Florida
Deceptive Practices and Unfair Trade Practices Act.210 The surety
had obligated itself under section 320.77(11) of the Florida Statutes
(1975) to pay any loss suffered by the consumer through the wrong-
ful acts of the mobile home dealer. Thus, since the consumer's losses
included attorney's fees and costs, the surety was liable for those
amounts which became part of the judgment.
In State v. Barquet, 21 the District Court of Appeal, Third Dis-
trict, held that the state may not recover damages through a parens
patriae action against unlicensed abortionists under the Florida
Deceptive Practices and Unfair Trade Practices Act. Although the
statute"' allows the state to obtain a declaratory judgment or an
injunction, it does not provide for the recovery of damages on behalf
of the state.
205. Id. § 501.203(1).
206. Black v. Department of Legal Affairs, 353 So. 2d 655 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) ((per
curiam).
207. FLA. STAT. § 501.210 (1977).
208. 353 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
209. 360 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) (per curiam).
210. FLA. STAT. § 501.210 (1977).
211. 358 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).




The Consumer Finance Act was amended to provide that no
person or licensee shall be deemed in violation of the Act or be
subject to any civil or criminal liability for any act or omission made
in good faith in reliance upon an order, statement or rule issued by
the Department of Banking and Finance. This exemption will apply
even if a court should later invalidate the order, statement or rule.
21
The "odometer tampering" statute, section 319.35 of the Flor-
ida Statutes, has been amended to make it a crime to supply a
written odometer statement knowing it to be false or to bring into
Florida a motor vehicle which has an odometer which has been
illegally altered. Motor vehicle dealers must now furnish an odome-
ter disclosure statement to their customers, and motor vehicle
inspection stations must now record the odometer reading at each
inspection and have it readily available. The penalty for an inten-
tional violation of section 319.35 has been raised from a misde-
meanor to a felony of the third degree."'
Sections 634.401 through 634.431 were added to the Florida
Statutes in an effort to regulate "service warranty associations"
which issue service warranties or guaranties designed to indemnify
the consumer against the costs of repair or replacement of goods
used primarily for personal, family or household purposes. The act
delineates the requirements for licensing, funding and reporting of
licensees under the act."' One may speculate, however, whether all
these well-intentioned provisions will result in legislative over-kill
of the regulated associations.
The addition of section 371.84 to the Florida Statutes now al-
lows boat marinas which have written leases providing for the sale
of owners' boats for unpaid storage fees to sell the boats at a public
sale when the rent has not been paid for six months. The legislation
provides for detailed steps in this nonjudicial sales process. For
example, no boat may be sold for less than fifty percent of its fair
market value, which shall be established by the separate appraisals
of two licensed property appraisers. Copies of the appraisals shall
be deposited with the Department of Natural Resources thirty days
prior to the sale. Any sale will be subject to prior perfected liens
against the boat. The Department of Natural Resources shall pro-
vide certification forms for sales and shall cause the title to the boat
to be transferred to the purchaser at a properly conducted sale.
213. Id. § 516.221 (Supp. 1978).
214. Id. § 319.35.
215. Id. §§ 634.401-.431.
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Some of the provisions of this legislation, especially the appraisal
concept, could well be adopted in section 9-504 of the UCC as a curb
on abuses by repossessing security interest holders .
2
1
The Automobile Inspection and Warranty Associations Act was
extensively amended to provide detailed requirements for reporting,
funding, licensing, premium reserves, record keeping and other
matters by such associations which issue automobile warranties.217
The Act both amends and substantially adds to existing legislation.
Under an amendment to the Motor Vehicles Sales Finance Act,
the finance charge limitations on the sale of motor vehicles will not
apply to any retail installment contract for the purchase of a mobile
home which is titled as a motor vehicle when the finance contract
is entered into pursuant to a commitment issued by the Veterans
Administration or the Federal Housing Administration. 8
Persons who enter into contracts with health studios must now
cancel their contracts within three days, rather than the former
seven days, after acceptance by the mailing or delivery of written
notice. The contract must state that if the studio goes out of busi-
ness and fails to provide substitute facilities within a five mile rad-
ius or moves its facilities more than five miles from the location
designated in the contract, the customer has a right to cancel the
contract. The contract must also provide for cancellation and a
refund if the customer dies or becomes totally and permanently
disabled during the membership term following the date of the con-
tract. The contract may not exceed thirty-six months, but it may
be renewed at the end of each thirty-six month period. The legisla-
tion also provides for a $10,000 bond requirement, or various substi-




In Florida, a liquor license is a general intangible, and a secu-
rity interest is perfected in it, as in other general intangibles, by the
filing of a financing statement with the Secretary of State of Florida,
not with the Division of Beverages, under section 561.65(3) of the
Florida Statutes (1977). Section 9-401(2) of the UCC provides that
an improper filing is effective against persons having knowledge of
the contents of the financing statement. This section, however,
216. Id. § 371.84.
217. 1978 Fla. Laws ch. 78-231.
218. FLA. STAT. § 520.08(5) (Supp. 1978).
219. Id. § 501.012.
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would not include incorrect filing with the Department of Beverages
because this section refers not to a filing which is totally improper,
but to a filing in only one place when more is required by the UCC,
or to a filing in the wrong place under the UCC. In addition, a
trustee in bankruptcy, as the hypothetical ideal lien creditor, is
deemed to be without -notice of an improperly filed financing state-
ment.2
B. Priorities
The District Court of Appeal, First District, using the illegiti-
mate rationale of International Harvester Credit Corp. v. American
National Bank,22" ' has held that workers who constructed boats for
their employer had a lien under section 713.60 of the Florida Stat-
utes (1975), which lien had priority over a bank with a prior per-
fected security interest in all of the boat company's inventory, raw
materials, work in progress and materials to be used or consumed
in the business, together with all after acquired property. The secu-
rity interest of the bank was, therefore, limited to the value of the
boat hulls after the satisfaction of the worker's liens.22 Because
International Harvester has been legislatively overruled, M its
equally illegitimate progeny should also be terminated.
In Barnett Bank v. Rompon,24 a bank had a perfected security
interest in a mobile home prior to its being affixed to the land.
Judgment lien creditors of the mortgagor purchased the mobile
home and the underlying land at an execution sale when the bank
foreclosed. The District Court of Appeal, Second District, held that
although a prior judgment between the mortgagor and the judgment
purchasers established that the mobile home was a fixture, this
judgment did not bind the bank under an estoppel by judgment
theory because it was not in privity with the mortgagors, as its
interests arose prior to those of the judgment purchasers. As a re-
sult, the bank had the right to litigate its claims that the mobile
home was not a fixture and that the bank was not required to com-
ply with the fixture filing rules.
Secured lenders of motor vehicles are concerned about the pos-
sibility of encumbered vehicles being forfeited to the state because
of their transporting contraband. Risk of loss has been reduced as a
220. In re Coed Shop, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 472 (N.D. Fla. 1977).
221. 296 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 1974);see notes 268-69 and accompanying text infra.
222. Smith v. Atlantic Boat Builder Co., 356 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
223. See notes 268-69 and accompanying text infra.
224. 359 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
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result of the decision in Griffis v. State,225 which held that under
sections 943.41 through 943.44 of the Florida Statutes (1975), there
cannot be a forfeiture of a vehicle for the transportation of drugs
unless there is a proven nexus between the drug found in the vehicle
and an illegal drug operation.
In O'Neill v. Barnett Bank,21 the court correctly held that a
buyer of an aircraft from a renter of aircraft who does not sell air-
craft from inventory cannot be a buyer in the ordinary course of
business under section 1-201(9) of the UCC. As a result, he will not
cut off a security interest in that aircraft under secton 9-307 of the
UCC which has been properly perfected under the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958.27 Incorrectly, however, the court went on to say that
even if the purchaser were a buyer in the ordinary course of business
under the UCC, he would not cut off the perfected security interest
because the Federal Aviation Act preempts section 9-307(1) under
case law from California 2 8 and section 329.01 of the Florida Statutes
(1975). The California case, however, represents the minority view
in the United States, and the federal statute does not control the
priority between claimants in this kind of a transactionY' If one
looks at section 329.01, it is clear that the court totally misread the
statute. Although the latter part of this case is dicta, the author
fears that this erroneous interpretation may cause trouble in the
future.
Wickes Corp v. General Electric Credit Corp. 2O involved a ques-
tion of priority between secured parties holding conflicting interests
in inventory and customer installment purchase agreements.
Wickes had a perfected security interest in a mobile home dealer's
inventory, proceeds of inventory and chattel paper. Mobile homes
were sold to consumers in return for "installment security agree-
ments," apparently chattel paper, which the dealer sold to General
Electric Credit (GEC). GEC took without knowledge of Wickes'
security interest. Some of the mobile homes were returned to the
dealer, which would rent them on behalf of these customers. When
the dealer defaulted on its loan, Wickes repossessed all of the
225. 356 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1978); accord, Nichols v. State, 356 So. 2d 933 (Fla. 2d DCA
1978); In re Forfeiture of 1972 Mercury, 357 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
226. 360 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
227. 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1970).
228. Dowell v. Beech Acceptance Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 544, 476 P.2d 401, 91 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 823 (1971).
229. E.g., Haynes v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 582 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1978); Sanders
v. M.D. Aircraft Sales, 575 F.2d 1086 (3d Cir. 1978); J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 948 (1972); U.C.C. § 9-104, comment 1.
230. 363 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
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dealer's inventory, including the returned mobile homes. The own-
ers of the homes and GEC brought an action against Wickes for
conversion; Wickes claimed the homes as part of inventory. The
court held that the returned homes did not become part of the
inventory of the dealer and, therefore, were not subject to the secu-
rity interest in inventory. The court also stated, however, that GEC
was a "purchaser for value of the customer installment purchase
security agreements. It took possession of the security agreements
in the ordinary course of business with no specific knowledge of the
security interest of Wickes, and it is entitled to recover the consider-
ation it paid for the security agreements."'1 GEC's security interest
was superior to Wickes'. Inasmuch as the facts indicate that Wickes
was claiming chattel paper as proceeds of the dealer's inventory
financing, however, GEC's lack of knowledge of Wickes' security
interest was totally irrelevant under the terms of section 9-308 of the
UCC. This careless language may lead to unfortunate results in
future cases.
C. Proceeds
In a case of first impression in Florida, the District Court of
Appeal, Second District, held that the wording in section 9-306(1)
of the UCC that "proceeds includes whatever is received when col-
lateral or proceeds is sold, exchanged, collected or otherwise dis-
posed of," is broad enough to include insurance proceeds received
as the result of a theft of the collateral. As a result, the insurance
payments came within the terms of the security agreement covering
proceeds of collateral. In addition, the prevailing secured creditors
were entitled to awards of attorneys' fees, as provided in the security
agreements because attorneys were retained for collection. The
court reasoned that these fees should have been awarded from the
insurance proceeds because the secured parties used the lawyers to
establish priority in this fund. 2
D. Usury
In another case of first impression in Florida, the District Court
of Appeal, Third District, held that when a borrower maintains a
231. Id. at 57.
232. Insurance Management Corp. v. Cable Serva., Inc., 359 So. 2d 572, 576 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1978). The court admitted that a split of case authority in the United States had
developed as to whether the phrase "otherwise disposed of' is broad enough to encompass
the involuntary loss by theft, fire, etc. The 1972 version of § 9-306(1) of the UCC does provide
that insurance payments are proceeds, "except to the extent that [the insurance policy] is
payable to a person other than a party to the security agreement."
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minimum loan balance with the lender and the parties then agree
to terminate this minimum loan balance in consideration of a large
fee which is based upon applying the interest rate of the agreement
against this balance for the remainder of the original loan period, it
is not to be deemed interest so as to render the loan usurious. In-
stead, this fee is to be deemed consideration for the termination of
a loan and not interest charged for the making of the loan. 33
E. Repossession and Foreclosure
The District Court of Appeal, First District, has held that when
a security agreement provides that the secured party has on default
the right to repossess as stated in section 9-503 of the UCC and there
is no express statement as to the secured party's right to come on
the debtor's land, then repossession of the collateral, a car, from the
debtor's unenclosed carport without threat or use of force is not a
trespass. The court stated that "[s]ection 679.503 implies, just as
it did at common law, a limited privilege to enter on the debtor's
land. The privilege may be exercised only 'without breach of the
peace.' ""
Whether a so-called "lease" is a lease or, in fact, a security
interest in goods, cannot be disposed of by a motion to strike, and
if the lease is in fact a security interest the debtor is entitled to
notice of sale upon repossession by the creditor. If notice is not
given, then the creditor may not recover a deficiency judgment.25
In Wickham v. Famco Services, Inc.,2'" the trial court refused
replevin to a holder of a security agreement who was suing the
debtor-owner of a mobile home. Nevertheless, the court ordered the
debtor to pay "rent" for use of the trailer and the secured party to
reimburse the debtor-owner's down payment as a setoff. The Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Second District, found the judgment of the
trial court totally inconsistent in permitting the debtor-owner to
retain possession but making him liable for damages for his rightful
possession in causing him to pay rent until he vacated the trailer.
In effect, the trial court ordered an implicit recission of the contract,
233. American Wood Prods., Inc. v. Walter Heller & Co. S.E., 358 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1978).
234. Marine Midland Bank-Central v. Cote, 351 So. 2d 750, 752 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
235. Burns v. Equilease Corp., 357 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Gibraltar Financial
& Leasing, Inc. v. Gonzalez, 353 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). Gibraltar also involved a
lease which the court implicitly treated as a security interest. The contract provided that the
lessor had the right to repossess the rented dental equipment upon a failure by the lessee to
pay rent. The lessor could then sell the equipment and recover from the lessee the total of
the rents, less the resale price. This agreement was upheld.
236. 350 So. 2d 1159 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
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which neither party sought. The Second District reversed and re-
manded for a new trial on the merits.
An unpaid seller of building materials may, in the event that
the materials have not been affixed to the land, either peacefully
repossess the goods or elect to replevy them under section 713.15 of
the Florida Statutes (1977). If the materials have been partly paid
for, the repossessing seller must refund this amount before taking
possession. In replevin, in contrast, the court will limit the seller's
rights to those goods for which payment has not been made. 37 This
replevin statute has created a "quasi" security interest which is not
found in the ordinary credit sale of goods transaction.
Section 9-504(3) of the UCC, which requires the creditor's sale
of the encumbered collateral to be made in a commercially reasona-
ble manner if the creditor seeks a deficiency judgment against the
debtor, received an unusual application in Applestein v. National
Bank.38 A guaranty of a limited amount of corporate debt was se-
cured by an interest in an aircraft. The State of Florida issued a tax
warrant sale. The creditor claimed a deficiency judgment against
the corporate owner of the aircraft, which aircraft was then sold at
public sale to the creditor, who subsequently sold it at a private sale.
The creditor claimed a deficiency judgment against the guarantor.
The court held that the tax sale did not constitute a merger and that
the creditor would have to show that the sale was conducted in a
commercially reasonable manner in order to receive a deficiency
award upon summary judgment.
In Matthews v. Page,3 ' an informally drawn sales agreement
provided that the buyer agreed to pay " 'a minimum of $400.00 per
month until the total amount is paid for.'" The buyer paid more
than this amount for three months and then made no payments for
two months. The ambiguously worded agreement might mean that
the buyer's excess payments were to be applied to the payments for
the succeeding months, and, therefore, the payments might not be
in default. As a result, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District,
held it reversible error for the trial court to direct a verdict for the
repossessing seller when the buyer sued him in trover.
In First National Commerce and Finance Co. v. Indiana Na-
tional Bank, 4' a case of apparent first impression in Florida, the
District Court of Appeal, Third District, held that when a mechanic
has a lien which is superior to a prior perfected security interest
237. National Steel Prods. Co. v. Myrick, 353 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
238. 358 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
239. 354 So. 2d 458, 459 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
240. 360 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
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under section 679.310 of the Florida Statutes (1975) and the me-
chanic sells the liened goods under section 85.031(2), the purchaser
at this sale takes title to the goods subject to the prior perfected
security interest unless the holder of this security interest has actual
notice of the sale. The court reasoned that it would be a denial of
due process to construe the statute as allowing a sale to cut off the
interest of the secured party without his having actual notice of the
sale. The dissenting judge decried the judicial amendment of the
statute. He was of the view that the statute was constitutional as
written, but that in the instant case, where the sales price was so
grossly out-of-line with the value of the goods, the court should set
aside the sale."'
In a succinct opinion, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth
District, held that plaintiff's security interest in accounts and con-
tract rights did not constitute an assignment of a mechanic's lien
and was not sufficient to transfer the right to foreclose an alleged
mechanic's lien.2
42
F. Replevin, Garnishment and Attachment
The Supreme Court of Florida upheld as constitutional the
Florida prejudgment replevin statute 2 3 in Gazil, Inc. v. Super Foods
Services, Inc.2" The court held, contrary to three of its prior deci-
sions," 5 that due process requires only that there be an opportunity
given to the defendant for a prompt post-seizure hearing, as opposed
to a requirement of such a hearing.
Moreover, in United Presidential Life Insurance Co. v. King,ul
the supreme court held that in postjudgment garnishment proceed-
ings, there is neither a constitutional requirement that prior notice
of garnishment be given to the judgment debtor nor a requirement
of any hearing before the writ issues. As a result, the court upheld
as constitutional sections 77.01 and 77.03 of the Florida Statutes
(1975). Significantly, the supreme court did not decide that pre-
judgment garnishment was also constitutional under these sections.
The case involved the garnishment of a debt owed by an insurance
company to its employee, who was the designated agent of the com-
241. Id. at 798.
242. Hunt Truck Sales & Serv. v. Holopak Village, 363 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
243. FLA. STAT. § 78.068 (1977).
244. 356 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 1978).
245. Ray Lein Constr., Inc. v. Wainwright, 346 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 1977); Phillips v. Guin
& Hunt, Inc., 344 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 1977); Unique Caterers, Inc. v. Rudy's Farm Co., 338 So.
2d 1067 (Fla. 1977).
246. 361 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 1978).
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pany in Florida. The creditor of the employee obtained a writ of
garnishment. The Insurance Commissioner sent notice of the writ
to the employee because he was the company's Florida agent, but
the employee did not notify the insurance company. Thus, the gar-
nishee did not receive actual notice until after a default judgment
for the full amount of the debt. The supreme court found that the
service of process to the garnishee was sufficient because it was
made in accordance with section 624.422 of the Florida Statutes
(1975) establishing the designated agent system. The insurance
company assumed responsibility for the actions of this agent
through its selection of him; thus, the service of process was binding
on the corporation even though it was never informed by its em-
ployee. In light of the fact that the employer-garnishee defaulted
because of failure to receive notice, however, the trial judge abused
his discretion in not setting aside the final judgment in that it would
be inequitable to enforce the judgment against the employer with-
out allowing it an opportunity to prove that it did not owe money
to its employee. 47
Country Clubs Ltd. v: Zaun Equipment, Inc.245 also involved
service of process on a registered agent. The garnishee was a limited
partnership. Service of the writ of garnishment was made upon the
registered agent for the receipt of process of one of the corporate
general partners of the garnishee limited partnership. The court
held this to be sufficient service of process on the garnishee although
the corporate general partner had assigned its interests to the other
general partner, because the limited partnership, through its certifi-
cate of organization on file with the Department of State, purported
to have the corporation as one of its general partners. Thus, the
garnishor acted in reliance and the limited partnership was es-
topped to deny that the corporation was no longer a partner at the
time that the writ of garnishment was served. Under section
48.193(1)(g) of the Florida Statutes (1975), the mere allegation in a
garnishor's affadavit that a nonresident foreign corporation had en-
tered into a contract with the principal debtor will not support the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over the garnishee. Evidently, how-
ever, if the garnishor asserts that its cause of action arose directly
from a breach of the contract which was performable in Florida,
247. See Hauser v. Dr. Chatelier's Plant Food Co., 350 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977),
wherein the court held that it is reversible error to enter a final judgment against a garnishee
after a default judgment has been entered against him without the receiving of evidence of
any indebtedness from the garnishee to the judgment debtor..
248. 350 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
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then jurisdiction may be found."'
In Capeletti Brothers, Inc. v. Wild,29 0 the District Court of Ap-
peal, Third District, resolved another jurisdictional issue. A creditor
had obtained a judgment against Wild in county court. Wild subse-
quently obtained a judgment against Capeletti Brothers, Inc., in
circuit court. The creditor of Wild, through county court proceed-
ings, then served writs of garnishment on Capeletti Brothers, Inc.,
which was indebted to Wild as a result of the circuit court decision.
Thereafter, the circuit court judge entered an order directing Cape-
letti Brothers, Inc., to pay Wild the amount of the adjudged debt
and dismissing the garnishment actions with prejudice. As a result,
the county court refused to take any further action in the garnish-
ment proceedings against Capeletti Brothers, Inc., in that court.
The Third District found that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction
to discharge garnishment actions in the county court, particularly
when the garnishor was not a party in the circuit court action.
In ITT Community Development Corp. v. Barton,25' a case of
first impression under Florida law, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit held that a federal district court does not
have the power under Florida law, the Federal All Writs Act 52 or the
inherent power doctrine5 3 to order Florida attorneys who were gar-
nished to pay into the court funds, paid to them by their client as
unearned legal fees, in order to secure the payment of a judgment
which might later be entered against the attorneys. The court noted
that Florida law does not authorize this procedure, which would not
come within the inherent power of the court. The All Writs Act
would authorize this order only if the complaining party had shown
that the turnover procedure had to be employed in order to prevent
the attorneys from impeding or defeating the power of the court to
conclude the litigation.
Section 222.11 of the Florida Statutes (1977) exempts from gar-
nishment the wages of a head of a family. In Miami Herald Publish-
ing Co. v. Payne,1' the Supreme Court of Florida held that when a
writ of garnishment has been served upon an employer and an em-
ployee files his affidavit under section 222.12 of the Florida Statutes
(1975) claiming that he is the head of a household and that his
249. Cosmopolitan Health Spa, Inc. v. Health Indus., Inc., 362 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 4th DCA
1978).
250. 363 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (per curiam).
251. 569 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1978).
252. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970).
253. See 569 F.2d at 1358-61.
254. 358 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 1978).
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wages, therefore, cannot be garnished, a contraverting affidavit
must be filed within two days. If it is not filed, the garnishment
proceeding is terminated as a matter of law, and the court has no
continuing jurisdiction over the employer.
The statutory prohibition of garnishment of the wages of a head
of a family25 was interpreted by the District Court of Appeal, Fourth
District, in Killian v. Lawson."5 ' The result was a questionable ex-
pansion of the law. The court held that a divorced husband who is
paying alimony to his former wife is the head of a family and his
wages are exempt from garnishment. The court stressed that the
duty of the man to support his ex-wife is the important considera-
tion, not the fact that they were residing apart. The dissent stated
that "there can be no head of a family when there is no family. '""
In Miami National Bank v. Barnett Bank,25' the District Court
of Appeal, Third District, reversed a default judgment and an order
denying a motion to set aside the judgment. The court determined
that proof filed one day late by a garnishee bank that it had termi-
nated the employment of an officer in charge of review of writs of
garnishment and had assigned his tasks to another employee, which
delayed its answering the garnishment, was a meritorious defense
under the rules showing excusable neglect sufficient to set aside a
default judgment.25
In Florida National Bank v. Rosen,89 the District Court of Ap-
peal, Third District, held that a garnishee bank was entitled to costs
and reasonable attorney's fees when the garnishor sought to garnish
funds to satisfy a judment debt owed by a depositor of the bank. It
was reversible error for the trial court to award ten dollars for both
of these expenses incurred by the bank through the garnishmment.
G. Attachment and Garnishment Legislation
Several of the Florida statutes dealing with attachment were
amended. The writ of attachment must now be issued by a judge."6 '
The writ may issue when the justifying grounds clearly appear in a
verified complaint or in a separate affidavit of the plaintiff.", After
execution of the writ of attachment, the property must be returned
255. FLA. STAT. § 222.11 (1977).
256. 362 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
257. Id. at 1008 (Moore, J., dissenting).
258. 350 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
259. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.500(d) & 1.540(d).
260. 353 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
261. FLA. STAT. § 76.03 (Supp. 1978).
262. Id. § 76.08.
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to the defendant upon the posting of a bond in an amount which
shall exceed by one-fourth the value of the property or exceed by
one-fourth the value of the claim, whichever is less." 3 Finally, the
defendant is entitled to an immediate hearing upon his motion for
a dissolution of the attachment. This motion shall be granted unless
the plaintiff proves the grounds upon which the attachment writ
was issued and proves a reasonable probability that he will receive
a favorable final judgment."' In addition, employers may now be
garnished to enforce an award against an employee for alimony or
child support or both. The salary of this employee may be garnished
on a periodic and continuing basis until further order of the court."5
H. Miscellaneous
In Flagship State Bank v. Carantzas, "I a lien creditor delivered
his writ of execution to the sheriff, who did not execute the writ.
Two years later, a second lien creditor delivered his writ against the
same debtor. The sheriff levied this writ and conducted a sale under
the advertised notice that the sale would be to the highest cash
bidder. The notice was explicit that the sale was subject to the
rights of the first execution creditor. The court held that the second
lien creditor could not bid in a portion of his claim instead of paying
fully in cash. In addition, the purchasing second lien creditor took
title subject to the first execution lienholder's rights, since he took
with notice of these rights.
In Florida, a debtor sending a check to his creditor has the right
to designate that the proceeds of the check shall be used to pay a
particular debt, and if the amount of the check exceeds this debt,
the creditor may not apply the excess amount to another alleged
debt owed by the debtor but which is contested by the debtor. If the
creditor should refuse to return the excess amount upon demand,
this constitutes a conversion of the funds."7
L Legislation
The rationally inexplicable 1974 case of International Harvester
Credit Corp. v. American National Bank"8 has been legislatively
overruled. 2" The Supreme Court of Florida in International
263. Id. § 76.18.
264. Id. § 76.24(1).
265. Id. § 61.12(2).
266. 352 So. 2d 1259 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
267. All Cargo Transp., Inc. v. Florida E.Coast Ry., 355 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
268. 296 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 1974).
269. FLA. STAT. § 679.312(3)-(4) (Supp. 1978).
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Harvester had held that when a purchase money but unperfected
security interest holder was competing with a prior perfected secu-
rity interest holder who claimed an interest in after-acquired prop-
erty of the debtor, the prior creditor had a claim only to the debtor's
equity in the after-acquired property. Now, as originally stated in
section 9-312 of the UCC, if the purchase money security interest
holder does not perfect by the filing of a financing statement within
ten days, the holder of a perfected security interest in after-acquired
property of the debtor takes priority over the unperfected purchase
money lender in all of the collateral, not just in the borrower's
equity.
J. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
The "preference" section of the new Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978270 will seriously curtail the free-wheeling floating lien provi-
sions27' of the UCC in the event of bankruptcy. Under the new Act,
a financier of security interests in inventory and accounts (and pro-
ceeds of either) whose amount of the debt exceeds the value of the
collateral at a point ninety days before bankruptcy and who has
received transfers during said period which reduced the amount of
the debt to the prejudice of unsecured creditors would have to dis-
gorge these transfers to the trustee as a voidable preference. 72 If the
financier is an "insider,""' for instance, a relative, general partner,
or officer, director or controlling party of a corporation, the prefer-
ence period has been extended to one year prior to the filing of the
bankruptcy petition."7 ' In the noninsider preference cases, it will no
longer be necessary to allege and prove that the debtor was insolvent
when the voidable preference transfer was made.275 In insider prefer-
ence cases, it will still be necessary for the trustee to, allege and
prove that the insider had reasonable cause to believe that the
debtor was insolvent at the time of such transfer in order to recap-
ture preferences made during the extended one-year period.,
For purposes of the voidable preference, the debtor will be pre-
sumed to have been insolvent for the ninety days immediately pre-
270. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549.
271. U.C.C. § § 9-204, -302, -402. The floating lien created by the UCC has been judicially
protected. E.g. DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1969); Grain Merchants, Inc. v.
Union Bank & Sav. Co., 408 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1969).
272. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 547(C)(5), 92 Stat. 2599.
273. Id. § 101(25).
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ceding the date of the filing of the petition. This presumption ap-
pears to refer to the burden of coming forward with the evidence
rather than the burden of persuasion." 7 Also, the former four-month
rule for voidable preferences has been reduced to ninety days prior
to the filing of the bankruptcy petition."' The old twenty-one day
grace period for the perfection of transfers has now been reduced to
ten days,"' and it appears that the twenty-one day grace period rule
in section 9-304 of the UCC will also have to be eliminated.
In addition, the preference section seems to have freed from the
taint of preference payments of debts by the bankrupt made within
forty-five days of the incurrence of the debts in the ordinary course
of business of both the debtor and the transferee-creditor.'" Space
and subject matter limitations, however, do not permit a complete
review of this extensive act.
277. Id. § 547(F).
278. Id. § 547.
279. Id. § 547(c)(3)(B), (e)(2)(A)-(C).
280. Id. § 547 (c)(2).
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